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Abstract
We use 130 years of data on historical migrations to the United States to show a causal
effect of the ancestry composition of US counties on foreign direct investment (FDI) sent
and received by local firms. To isolate the causal effect of ancestry on FDI, we build a simple
reduced-form model of migrations: Migrations from a foreign country to a US county at
a given time depend on (i) a push factor, causing emigration from that foreign country to
the entire United States, and (ii) a pull factor, causing immigration from all origins into
that US county. The interaction between time-series variation in origin-specific push factors
and destination-specific pull factors generates quasi-random variation in the allocation of
migrants across US counties. We find that doubling the number of residents with ancestry
from a given foreign country relative to the mean increases the probability that at least one
local firm engages in FDI with that country by 4 percentage points. We present evidence
that this effect is primarily driven by a reduction in information frictions, and not by better
contract enforcement, taste similarities, or a convergence in factor endowments.
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International migrations have reached unprecedented levels over the past decades,1 shaping
an increasingly ethnically diverse and socially connected world. The economic consequences
of these migrations are at the heart of fierce political debates on immigration policy, yet our
understanding of their economic effects remain incomplete. At the same time, foreign direct
investment (FDI) has become a defining feature of international production.2 Local policymakers
see attracting and retaining FDI as a major goal, and technology transfers through FDI are both
a conduit for technological progress abroad and a source of revenue for US firms.3 Migrations
and FDI create two parallel global networks, one of ethnic connections, one of parent-subsidiary
linkages. How do these two networks affect each other? In this paper, we estimate the long-term
effect of immigration on the patterns of FDI sent and received by US firms, and shed light on
the mechanism behind this effect. We show the ethnic connections emanating from migrations
reaching back more than a century have a large positive causal effect on the propensity of US
firms to engage in FDI with the historical migrants’ countries of origin; and this effect appears
to be driven primarily by a reduction of information frictions.
Evaluating the causal impact of migrations on FDI requires a rigorous identification strategy,
as unobserved factors may simultaneously affect migrations, ancestry, and FDI, creating a spuri-
ous correlation between them. For example, historical migrations might have occurred between
origins and destinations with certain unobserved climatic or other characteristics, and these char-
acteristics might in turn drive FDI today. Similarly, past FDI might itself cause migration, for
example because foreign employers second employees to work at their US subsidiaries.
To overcome these challenges we construct a set of instrumental variables (IV) for the present-
day ancestry composition of US counties, best explained by the examples of migrations from
Germany and Italy. German migrations peaked at the end of the nineteenth century when the
Midwest was booming and attracting large numbers of migrants. We observe a large population
with German ancestry in the Midwest today. Italian migrations peaked a few decades later, at
the beginning of the twentieth century when the West was attracting large numbers of migrants.
We observe a large population with Italian ancestry in the West today. We use this interaction
of time-series variation in the relative attractiveness of different destinations within the United
States (e.g. end of nineteenth century Midwest versus early twentieth century West) with the
staggered arrival of migrants from different origins (e.g. end of nineteenth century Germany
1In 2013, there were 232 million international migrants, an all time high (UN Population Facts No. 2013/2).
2In 2009, 55% of all US exports emanated from US multinationals that operated subsidiaries abroad. These
firms employ 23 million Americans, while US subsidiaries of foreign firms employ another 5 million. Source: Office
of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet on International Investment.
3See McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and Holmes et al. (2015).
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versus early twentieth century Italy) to instrument for the present-day distribution of ancestries.
This formal IV strategy is essential. For instance, while the effect of ancestry on FDI is positive
in both ordinary least squares (OLS) and IV specifications, its effect on international trade drops
and becomes insignificant when we instrument for ancestry, suggesting that unobservable factors
indeed confound simple OLS estimates of these effects.
Our paper makes three main contributions: (i) historical migrations and the ethnic diversity
they created have a quantitatively large causal effect on FDI; (ii) this ethnic determinant of FDI
appears to operate mainly because it facilitates the flow of information; and (iii) we propose a
general method for instrumenting the composition of ancestry across US counties.
Before describing the related literature, we summarize our main empirical results.
We find that, for an average US county, doubling the number of individuals with ancestry
from a given origin country increases by 4 percentage points the probability that at least one
firm from this US county engages in FDI with that country, and increases by 7% the number
of local jobs at subsidiaries of firms headquartered in that country. These effects persist over
generations: even nineteenth century migrations significantly affect the patterns of FDI today.
To arrive at those findings on the causal impact of foreign ancestry on the patterns of FDI,
we follow an IV strategy. We motivate our approach using a simple reduced-form dynamic model
of migrations. Migrations from a given origin country o to a given US destination county d in
period t depend on the total number of migrants arriving in the United States from o (a push
factor), the relative economic attractiveness of d to migrants arriving in t (a pull factor), and the
size of the pre-existing local population of ancestry o in d at t, allowing for the fact that migrants
tend to prefer settling near others of their own ethnicity (a recursive factor). Solving the model
recursively shows the number of residents in d today who are descendants of migrants from o is
a function of simple and higher-order interactions of the sequence of pull and push factors.
To construct valid instruments from this sequence of interactions, we isolate variation in the
pull and push factors that is plausibly independent of any unobservables that may make a given
destination within the US differentially more attractive for FDI from a given origin country. To
that end, we measure the pull factor from country o to county d as the fraction of migrants
coming from anywhere in the world who settle in d at time t, excluding migrants from the
same continent as o. The pull from o towards d thus depends only on the destination choices
of migrants arriving at the same time from other continents. Similarly, we measure the push
factor as the total number of migrants arriving in the United States from o at time t, excluding
migrants from o who settled in the same region as d. We then instrument for the present-day
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number of residents in county d with ancestry from country o using the full set of simple and
higher-order interactions of these pull and push factors. Using the entire series of interactions
going back to 1880 maximizes the statistical power of our IV strategy.
A major advantage of this ‘leave-out push-pull’ approach is that it yields a specific instrument
for migrations from each origin to each destination at each point in time, uniquely allowing us
to simultaneously control for both origin and destination fixed effects, and to conduct a number
of falsification exercises and robustness checks. For example, we obtain quantitatively very
similar effects of ancestry on FDI when we combine our IV strategy with a natural experiment
surrounding the rise and fall of communism. These specifications, similar to a difference-in-
difference, measure how variations in ancestry driven only by the instrumented inflow of defectors
from communist countries explain changes in FDI, from zero in 1989 to its current level in 2014.
This flexibility of our instruments also delivers the statistical power to isolate specific channels
linking ancestry to FDI: common ancestry may affect FDI because it (i) induces similarities in
tastes for consumption, (ii) causes a convergence in factor endowments, facilitating horizontal
FDI, (iii) provides social collateral for contract enforcement, substituting for poor institutions,
or (iv) reduces information frictions. We find no evidence in support of the first three channels.
Common ancestry does not affect FDI in the final goods sector more than in the intermediate
goods sector, does not appear to cause a convergence in the sectoral distribution of employment,
and has a significantly weaker impact on FDI for countries with weak institutions.
To provide a direct test for the remaining hypothesis that common ancestry affects FDI
by reducing information frictions, we construct a novel measure of information demand about
foreign countries using data from Google internet searches. Our index reflects variation across
US metro areas in the relative frequency of search terms containing the names of each countries’
most prominent politicians, actors, athletes, and musicians. We find a large causal effect of
common ancestry on this index: residents of US metro areas with more ancestry from a given
country systematically acquire more information about the politics and culture of that country.
This fact fully accounts for the effect of ancestry on FDI, in the sense that controlling for our
index of information demand drives out the significance of common ancestry in predicting FDI.
We also find that the effects of ancestry on FDI and information flow continue to operate
long after migration from the origin country ceases, suggesting that immigrants pass traits to
their descendants that facilitate economic exchange with their origin countries. As one example,
foreign ancestry increases the use of the origin country’s language by US-born individuals.
To illustrate the quantitative implications of our results, we conduct two thought experiments.
In the first, we calculate the effect of Chinese exclusion – the effective ban on Chinese immigration
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between 1882 and 1965. Absent this ban, we predict the fraction of counties in the Northeast
with FDI links to China would have increased substantially (e.g. doubled in New York state).
In the second, we calculate the effect of a hypothetical “L.A. gold rush” – an early population
growth in Los Angeles before 1880 similar to the experience of San Francisco. We predict there
would be 60,000 more individuals with German and Irish ancestry in Los Angeles today, and
FDI between Los Angeles and Germany and Ireland would have increased by around 60%. The
effect of ancestry on FDI is thus large and economically important.
Finally, we note one important limitation to our analysis: Our results rely purely on variation
in the composition of FDI within the United States, not between countries. Although we believe
that, in light of our results, the ethnic diversity of the United States likely also raises FDI for
the country as a whole, we cannot exclude the possibility that increases in FDI in one state are
partially or fully offset by decreases in others.
Existing literature. A large literature shows that measures of affinity between regions, such
as common ancestry, social ties, trust, and telephone volume, correlate strongly with aggregate
economic outcomes, such as foreign direct investment (Guiso et al., 2009; Leblang, 2010), inter-
national asset flows (Portes and Rey, 2005), and trade flows (Gould, 1994; Rauch and Trindade,
2002).4 How much of this association should be interpreted as causal, however, remains an open
question because these measures of affinity are likely to be non-random.
Three recent papers make attempts at identifying a causal effect of migrations on FDI and
trade. Javorcik et al. (2011) use the cost of acquiring a passport and the existing stock of migrants
from different countries in the United States to instrument for the impact of migrations between
foreign countries and the United States on FDI. However, these instruments are most likely
correlated with both migrations to the United States and FDI flows, and thus likely violate the
exclusion restriction. Cohen et al. (2015) use the location of Japanese internment camps during
World War II, and Parsons and Vezina (2016) the placement of Vietnamese refugees after the
Vietnam War to identify a causal effect of those migrations on contemporary trade flows between
locations within the United States, and Japan and Vietnam, respectively. While the exclusion
restriction for the instruments in those two papers is plausible, instrumenting for migrations from
only one country makes it impossible to control for destination fixed effects, that is, unobserved
factors making a US state both a large recipient of migrants and a large importer and exporter.
Burchardi and Hassan (2013) use variation in wartime destruction across West German re-
4Also see Head and Ries (1998), Combes et al. (2005), Garmendia et al. (2012), and Aleksynska and Peri
(2014) for the relationship between common ancestry and trade and Bhattacharya and Groznik (2008) for its
relationship with FDI.
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gions to show evidence of a causal effect of social ties on changes in GDP growth and FDI in
East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall.5 Redding and Sturm (2008), Juha´sz (2014), and
Steinwender (2014) study the effect of historical shocks on economic interactions across borders.
We contribute to this literature in several ways. First, we identify a causal effect of ancestry
on FDI in a setting with a high degree of external validity directly relevant for assessing, for
example, the long-term effects of immigration policy. Second, because our identification strategy
can be applied to all origin countries and destination US counties, we are able to guard against a
wide range of possible confounding factors and to relate to the previous literature by employing
a gravity equation with both destination and origin fixed effects. Third, we show that ancestry
affects FDI most likely due to its effects on information flow.
Our paper also contributes to the debate on the costs and benefits of immigration. Much of
the existing literature has focused on the effects of migration on local labor markets, mostly in
the short run.6 A more recent literature focuses on the effect of cultural, ethnic, and birthplace
diversity on economic development and growth.7 Most closely related are Nunn et al. (2015) who
study the effect of immigration from all origins during the Age of Mass Migration on present-day
outcomes. Fulford et al. (2015) study the effect of historical ancestry composition of US counties
on local economic growth. We add to this literature by showing a long-term effect of migration
on the absolute advantage in conducting FDI of different regions that may explain part of the
association between diversity and long-term growth found in other studies.
Our approach to identification is related to Card (2001) who instruments immigration flows
from origin o to destination d with the interaction of the total immigration from o to the United
States (the push factor) and the spatial distribution of previous migrants from o in the United
States (the recursive factor). This strategy however is not appropriate in our context, where un-
observed and persistent origin-destination specific characteristics (such as the local climate) may
drive both the spatial distribution of previous migrants and FDI. Our approach instead combines
a push-pull model similar to that of Card (2001) with a two-dimensional version of the leave-out
approach of Bartik (1991) and Katz and Murphy (1992), and uses historical migrations going
back to the 19th century to instrument for the current stock of ancestry. This hybrid approach
can easily be replicated for other countries, time periods, or any variable where cumulated flows
matter, without the need for a rare or even unique historical accident.
5See Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Hassan (2015) and Chaney (2016) for surveys of this literature.
6See for example Card (1990), Card and Di Nardo (2000), Friedberg (2001), Borjas (2003), and Cortes (2008).
Borjas (1994) provides an early survey.
7See Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Putterman and Weil (2010), Peri (2012), Ashraf and Galor (2013), Ager and
Bru¨ckner (2013), Alesina et al. (2015a), and Alesina et al. (2015b).
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces our data. Section
2 gives a brief overview of the history of migration to the United States. Section 3 identifies
the causal effect of ancestry composition on FDI, conducts robustness checks, and illustrates the
quantitative implications of our findings using two thought experiments. Section 4 examines the
mechanism underlying the effect of ancestry on FDI.
1 Data
We collect data on migrations and ancestry, on FDI and trade, and on origin and destination
characteristics. Below is a description of our data, along with their source. Further details on
the construction of all data are given in Appendix A.
Migrations and Ancestry. Our migration and ancestry data are constructed from the
individual files of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) samples of the 1880,
1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 waves of the US census, and the 2006-2010
five-year sample of the American Community Survey. We weigh observations using the personal
weights provided by these data sources. Appendix Table 1 summarizes specific samples and
weights used. We cannot use data from the 1940, 1950 and 1960 censuses, because these did not
collect information on the year of immigration. The original 1890 census files were lost in a fire.
Throughout the paper, we use t − 1 and t to denote two consecutive census waves, o for
the foreign country of origin, and d for the US destination county. We construct the number of
migrants from origin o to destination d at time t, I to,d, by counting the number of respondents who
live in d, were born in o, and emigrated to the United States between t− 1 and t. The exception
to this rule is the 1880 census (the first in our sample), which also did not record the year of
immigration. The variable I1880o,d instead measures the number of residents who were either born
in o or whose parents were born in o, thus covering the two generations of immigrants arriving
prior to 1880.8 Since 1980, respondents have also been asked about their primary ancestry in
both the US Census and the American Community Survey, with the option to provide multiple
answers. Ancestryto,d corresponds to the number of individuals residing in d at time t who report
o as first ancestry. Note that this measure captures self-reported (recalled) ancestry.9
The respondents’ residence is recorded at the level of historic counties, and at the level of
historic county groups or PUMAs from 1970 onwards. Whenever necessary we use contempora-
neous population weights to transition data from the historic county group or PUMA level to
8If the own birthplace is in the United States, imprecisely specific (e.g., a continent), or missing, we instead
use the parents’ birthplace, assigning equal weights to each parent’s birthplace.
9See Duncan and Trejo (2016) for recent evidence on recalled versus factual ancestry in CPS data.
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the historic county, and then use area weights to transition data from the historic county level to
the 1990 US county level.10 The respondents’ stated ancestry (birthplace) often, but not always,
directly corresponds to foreign countries in their 1990 borders (for example, “Spanish” and “Den-
mark”). When no direct mapping exists (for example, “Basque” or “Lapland”), we construct
transition matrices that map data from the answer level to the 1990 foreign country level, using
approximate population weights where possible and approximate area weights otherwise. In the
few cases when answers are imprecisely specific or such a mapping cannot be constructed (for
example, “European” or “born at sea”), we omit the data.11 The resulting dyadic dataset covers
3,141 US counties, 195 foreign countries, and 10 census waves.
Foreign Direct Investment. Our data on FDI is from the US file of the 2014 edition of
the Bureau van Dijk ORBIS data set.12 For each US firm, the database lists the location of its
(operational) headquarters, the addresses of its foreign parent entities, and the addresses of its
partially or fully owned international subsidiaries and branches. In our main specification, we
treat all equity stakes of any size as constituting a parent-subsidiary link.13 Altogether, we have
information on 36,108 US firms that have at least one foreign parent or subsidiary. Collectively,
these firms have 102,618 foreign parents and 176,332 foreign subsidiaries.14 Our main outcome
variable, 1 [FDIo,d > 0], is 1 if at least one firm in d has at least one parent or subsidiary in o,
0 otherwise. It captures both outward FDI (US firms with foreign subsidiaries) and inward FDI
(foreign firms with US subsidiaries). We also count the number of FDI linkages between o and
d (the number of foreign parents and subsidiaries in o of all firms in d), the number of unique
parents and subsidiaries in both o and d, the number of employees working at firms in d with
a foreign parent in o (# of Employees at Subsidiaries in Destination),15 and the 2-digit NAICS
code of the sector of the US firm. See Appendix A.2 for details. The resulting dataset covers the
same 3,141 US counties, 195 foreign countries and 612,495 origin-destination pairs as above.
Other Data. To streamline the exposition, we discuss our measure of information demand
in section 4.2. In addition, we use data on aggregate trade flows between US states and foreign
10We also aggregate our data to the PUMA level and show that our results are robust.
11Appendix Tables 2 and 3 report summary statistics on these data transitions, including the share of affected
respondents. Appendix A.1 provides a detailed description of the data transformation.
12In robustness checks we show that our results do not change when we instead use data from the 2007 file.
13Appendix Table 11 shows that our results are almost completely unchanged when we restrict ourselves to
links with an ownership stake larger than 5%, 25% or 50%.
14Although Bureau van Dijk cross checks the data on international subsidiaries and branches using both US
and foreign data sources, we cannot exclude the possibility that coverage may be better for some countries than
for others. However, all of our specifications control for country fixed effects such that any such variation in
coverage at the country level would not affect our results.
15When information on the number of employees is missing (which is the case for 95% and 58% of subsidiaries
in the destination and origin, respectively), we assume the subsidiary employs one person.
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countries for the year 2012 from the US Census Bureau.16 We construct geographic distances,
absolute latitude differences, and measures of agricultural similarity between US counties and
foreign countries, and collect information on a number of characteristics for countries, counties,
and sectors. See Appendix A.3 for details.
Summary Statistics. Panel A of Table 1 gives summary statistics on our sample of 3,141
× 195 origin-destination pairs.17 Column 1 shows means and standard deviations for all ob-
servations. Columns 3-4 show the same statistics for the subsamples of origin-destination pairs
containing only observations with non-zero ancestry, and ancestry in the bottom and top quin-
tile, respectively. The table shows that a lot of the variation both in ancestry and FDI is at the
extensive margin. Only 1.8% of origin-destination pairs have an FDI link. Conditional on the
US county having any population with origins in the foreign country, 3.1% have an FDI link.
The larger this population, the larger the probability of finding an FDI link, with 12.8% of the
origin-destination pairs in the top quintile having an FDI link. Appendix Figure 3 visualises ex-
amples of this relationship: for each of the 10 largest US counties in terms of total FDI linkages,
it scatters the number of FDI links to o against the number of individuals of ancestry o in d;
regression lines are fitted for the top 10% ancestry groups and bottom 90% separately. In almost
all cases larger ancestry groups are more likely to have an FDI link, and they have more FDI
links. Panel A of Table 1 also shows that about half of the origin-destination pairs have ancestry
of zero: most destinations in the United States do not have populations with ancestry from all
195 origin countries. The mean number of individuals with ancestry from a given origin is 316,
but is highly skewed, with a mean in the top quintile of 2,852 individuals. Compared to this
stock of ancestry, the flow of immigrants between 1990 and 2000 is relatively small, with 23 on
average across the sample. The summary statistics also show that the number of first-generation
immigrants (foreign born) measured in the 2010 American Communities Survey appears some-
what understated (69 on average). This fact is known in the literature and appears to affect only
the measurement of immigration flows but not the stock of ancestry (Jensen et al., 2015). For
this reason, we exclude the 2000-2010 wave of migrations from our standard specification (its
inclusion however has no effect on any of our main results).
Panels B and C show summary statistics following the same format for destination counties
and origin countries for variables used in our estimation of heterogenous effects. Appendix Table
16When we aggregate our dataset across US states, the correlation with aggregate trade between the entire
US and foreign countries from the NBER bilateral trade dataset is 99.9% for imports and 99.7% for exports
respectively (in 2008). When we aggregate our data across foreign countries, the correlation between state level
aggregate trade and state population is 93% for imports and 88% for exports respectively. We are therefore
confident our trade dataset at the US state × foreign country level is not subject to severe measurement error.
1753 countries have no FDI links with US firms in our sample.
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4 gives summary statistics on the intensive margin of FDI.
2 Historical Background
The 1880 US census counted 50 million residents, 10 million of which were first- or second-
generation immigrants from 195 countries. The censuses taken since 1880 counted an additional
67 million immigrants. Our sample period thus covers the vast majority of migrations.18
Until World War I, migration to the United States was largely unregulated. European mi-
grants in particular faced few or no restrictions and came in large numbers. Figure 1 shows the
extent and the changing composition of migration over time. Although the peak of British migra-
tion was passed before the beginning of our sample, the numbers for 1880 clearly show the effect
of the potato famines and the subsequent large inflow of Irish migrants. The second big wave of
migration in our sample is that of Germans in the aftermath of the failed revolutions of 1848 and
the consolidation of the German empire under Prussian control in 1871. Similarly disrupted by
political changes and an economic crisis in the South, Italians migrated to the United States in
large numbers around 1910, followed by a peak in migrations from Eastern Europe and Russia
in the years after the October Revolution. The inflow of migrants overall dropped dramatically
during World War I, falling below 4 million during the period between 1910 and 1930.
While economic and political factors in the origin countries dominated the timing of these
earlier European migrations, US immigration policies became relatively more important during
the 1920s. The first important step toward regulating the inflow of migrants was the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 that ended the migration of laborers, first from China, and then in follow-
ing incarnations from almost all of Asia. These restrictions were followed by literacy and various
other requirements that came into effect after 1917, culminating in the establishment of a quota
system in 1921. The quota system limited the overall number of immigrants, reduced the flow
of migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, and effectively shut out Africans, Asians, and
Arabs. Combined with the effects of the Great Depression, these new regulations led to negative
net migration in the early 1930s and then a stabilization at relatively low levels of immigration.
The quota system was abolished in 1965 in favor of a system based on skills and family relation-
ships, leading both to a large increase in the total number of migrants and a shift in composition
toward migrants from Asia and the Americas, in particular from Mexico.
Figure 2 maps the spatial settlement pattern of newly arrived immigrants in the United
18The historical information in this section is from Daniels (2002) and Thernstrom (1980). Also see Goldin
(1994) for the political economy of US immigration policy.
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States over time. For each census from 1880 to 2010, we project the total number of new
migrants from all origins to destination d, I td, on destination and year fixed effects to account
for general immigration time trends and persistent destination-specific effects. The figure shows
the residuals from this projection, color coded by decile. Migrants initially settled on the East
Coast of the United States (in the mid-19th century), and then the frontier for migrants moved
to the Midwest (in the late-19th century), to the West (1900-30), and to the South (in the 1980s).
Starting in the 1970s, we can also see graphically the increased settlement of migrants in urban
centers, with a series of dark dots appearing around large urban areas.
In the next section, we use historical variation in both the timing of migrations from for-
eign countries to the U.S., and the timing of how attractive US counties are for newly arriving
migrants, as the basis of our identification strategy.
3 Ancestry and Foreign Direct Investment
Before presenting formally our econometric model and results, we use a stylized historical example
to describe the intuition behind our ‘leave-out push-pull’ approach to identification.
The purpose of our identification strategy is to isolate variation in the distribution of present-
day ancestry which is independent of unobserved factors that could also affect the distribution
of FDI. Figure 3 illustrates our approach using two specific examples: that of migrations from
Germany, with a migration peak in the pre-1900 period (corresponding to the failed 1848 rev-
olution and the consolidation of the German empire under Prussian control), and that of Italy,
with a peak in the 1900-30 period (triggered by the end of feudalism and demographic pressures,
and ending with Mussolini’s anti-emigration policies).19 The top-left part shows the relative
attractiveness of US destinations for pre-1900 migrants, when German migrations to the United
States peaked, as measured by the location choices of non-European migrants. At that time,
most of these non-European migrants settled in the Midwest. Accordingly, we expect most Ger-
man migrants from this initial wave to also have settled in the Midwest. The top-right part
shows the distribution of US residents with German ancestry in 2010, with disproportionately
many in the Midwest. The bottom-left part shows the relative attractiveness of US destinations
for non-European migrants during the 1900-30 period, when Italian migrations to the United
States peaked. At that time, the preferred destination for non-European migrants had shifted
to the West and South. We expect many Italian migrants to have settled in these areas. The
19In absolute terms, there were also large migrations from Italy prior to 1900, but arrivals from Germany and
Ireland were far more numerous during that earlier period.
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bottom-right part shows the distribution of Italian descendants in 2010, with relatively large
populations in the West and South.
This is, in a nutshell, how we identify exogenous variation in the distribution of ancestry
across US counties. We use the interaction of time-series variation in the relative attractiveness
of different destinations within the United States (measured by the destination choices of migrants
from other continents) with the staggered arrival of migrants from different origins (measured
by the number of migrants from that origin that migrated to other regions within the US)
to instrument for the present-day distribution of ancestry: if, coincidentally, large numbers
emigrated from a given origin to the United States at the same time as a given location within
the United States was attracting migrants from all over the world, then we expect large numbers
of people in that US location with ancestry from that foreign country.
Importantly, this interaction of ‘leave-out push-pull’ factors is independent of plausible con-
founding factors that could make (or have made) a given destination in the US more attractive
for both migrations and FDI from a given origin country. Consider the example of Italian mi-
grants in the 1900-30 period. Suppose many Italian migrants skilled at growing wine settled in
US regions favorable to wine growing (e.g. Napa county). The same unobserved factor (a cli-
mate favorable to wine-growing) may very well explain why there are both residents with Italian
ancestry in Napa (descendants of wine makers), and FDI linkages between Napa and Italy (wine
making multinationals), creating a spurious (not causal) correlation between ancestry and FDI.
Our instruments remove this spurious correlation by predicting the number of Italians migrating
to Napa 1900-30 using only the interaction of the share of non-European immigrants who settled
in Napa with the number of Italians who settled outside the West Coast. Thus, if wine making
ability were the only true driver of migrations from Italy (or other European countries) to Napa
(or other counties on the West Coast), our leave-out push-pull instruments would predict zero
Napa residents with Italian ancestry today.20
The same is true for migrations induced by reverse causality and most other confounding
factors that might induce a spurious correlation between ancestry and FDI. For example, if the
true cause of the large Italian presence in Napa was that an Italian car manufacturer randomly
decided to invest in a Napa-based plant, and historically sent Italian workers to operate it, then
this investment would affect realized migrations between Italy and Napa, but would again have
no effect on the number of Napa residents with Italian ancestry predicted by our instruments.
20Incidentally, Figure 3 shows very few non-Europeans emigrated to Napa and Sonoma in 1900-30 (bottom left
map), while many residents of Napa and Sonoma have Italian ancestry (bottom right map). Our identification
strategy will not capture those descendants of Italian migrants in Napa and Sonoma. This is desirable, as both
Italian ancestry and FDI linkages would likely be correlated with unobserved factors (local climate).
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For this approach to fail, a confounding factor that promotes migration and FDI would have
to disproportionately cause large groups of migrants from two origins on two different continents
to systematically migrate to the same destinations across at least two different regions in the
same census periods. One example would be if migrants who are skilled at growing wine tended
to emigrate from Algeria (a non-European country suitable for wine) towards Napa precisely
at the same points in history when Italians also went to Napa and to the Champlain Valley in
upstate New York (a non-West Coast region suitable for wine), and if Algerians in Napa were a
large fraction of all migrants to Napa, and Italians in Champlain Valley a large fraction of all
Italians arriving in the United States. We would then predict a large number of Napa residents
with Italian ancestry, because of an unobserved factor (local climate) that directly affects both
migrations and FDI from Italy and Algeria to Napa and Champlain Valley. We argue below
that such occurrences are unlikely (Algerians did not in fact migrate to Napa in large numbers
1900-30), and offer a series of tests to gauge this possibility.
3.1 Identifying the Causal Impact of Migrations
To formally evaluate the effect of the presence of descendants of migrants from a given origin
on the probability that at least one firm within a given destination has an FDI link with a firm
based in the origin country (inward or outward), we estimate the structural gravity equation,21




o,dγ + εo,d, (1)
where 1 [FDIo,d > 0] is a dummy variable equal to 1 if any firm headquartered in destination d is
either the parent or the subsidiary of any firm headquartered in origin o in 2014, zero otherwise.22
Ao,d is a measure of common ancestry, usually calculated as the log of 1 plus the number of
residents in d that report having ancestors in origin o in 2010, measured in thousands (we choose
this functional form in anticipation of non-parametric results, but also show robustness to a wide
range of alternative specifications—see section 3.5). X ′o,d is a vector of control variables that
always includes the geographic distance between o and d, and the difference in latitude between
o and d. δo and δd represent a full set of origin and destination fixed effects, augmented in
most of our specifications by fixed effects for the interaction between destination and continent
21The gravity structure can be derived in a variety of models (Arkolakis et al., 2012). See Carr et al. (2001),
Razin et al. (2003), Head and Ries (2008), and Ramondo (2014) for applications to foreign direct investment.
22We use this combined measure of inward and outward FDI because our main results are largely identical
when separately considering inward and outward FDI. We report separate results for each direction below.
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of origin, and between origin and destination census region.23 The error term εo,d captures all
omitted influences, including any deviations from linearity.24 Standard errors are clustered at the
origin-country level, and our results are robust to alternative methods for calculating standard
errors (see section 3.5). The coefficient of interest is β, which measures the effect of ancestry on
the probability that an FDI relationship exists between firms in o and d.





discussed above, this condition is unlikely to hold despite the inclusion of origin and destination
fixed effects. First, origin-destination specific omitted factors might drive both economic trans-
actions and migration flows, affecting both Ao,d and 1 [FDIo,d > 0]. (Skills and climate favorable
to wine growing in our example above.) Second, past origin-destination specific migration flows
might be the result of economic transactions such as FDI or trade, not their driver.25 Third,
ancestry might be selectively recalled because of past or present economic interactions. These
challenges are not unique to our data, but are likely concerns with any data where ethnic linkages
and economic transactions are simultaneously observed.
To address these concerns, we devise an instrumental variables (IV) strategy based on a simple
dynamic model of migration: ancestry evolves recursively from the addition of new migrants
to the existing stock of ancestry. We assume the combination of three forces determines the
allocation of new migrants. A country-specific push factor drives migrants out of country o
into the United States; a pull factor attracts migrants entering the United States to county d,
irrespective of their origin; and a recursive factor corresponds to the tendency of newly arrived
migrants to settle in communities where people with the same ancestry already live.
The following equation is a simple linear formulation of these assumptions.














The stock of residents of ancestry o in destination d at time t, Ato,d, depends on four terms. First,
the constant terms at, ao,t, and ad,t control for residual forces, such as demographics, which may
vary over time, space, and between different ethnic groups. Second, the term btA
t−1
o,d corresponds
to the fact that ancestry is a stock variable that evolves cumulatively, where bt modulates how
ties to one’s ancestry are passed from one generation to the next, including attenuation due to
23A census region is one of nine groupings of adjacent US states listed in Appendix Table 5.
24We use a simple linear probability model, which allows for a straight-forward interpretation of the coefficient.
As a robustness check, we also report results from a probit estimator; see footnote 29.
25A real-life example of such reverse causality is the large Japanese ancestry in Scott County, Kentucky, which
emerged after Toyota seconded Japanese workers to a newly built manufacturing facility in the 1980s.
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is a linear interpretation of our
assumption that net migrations are determined by the combination of push, pull and recursive
factors. The push factor (the extent to which migrants are driven out of country o) is measured
by the total number of migrants from country o entering the United States at time t, I to. The
pull factor (the degree to which county d is appealing to migrants at time t) is measured by the
fraction of all migrants entering the United States who settle in county d from all origins, I td/I
t.
The recursive factor (the propensity of migrants to settle near their countrymen) is measured
by the fraction of people with ancestry from o who already live in d, At−1o,d /A
t−1
o . Intuitively,
we assume that part of the allocation of new migrants from o across counties (the push factor




part is proportional to the allocation of the existing stock of migrants from o (the recursive
factor At−1o,d /A
t−1
o ). The coefficients ct and dt control for the relative importance of the pull and
recursive factors. If the pull factor is absent (ct = 0), our model collapses exactly to the Card
(2001) model. Finally, νto,d is a sequence of error terms that are potentially correlated with εo,d.
Equation (2) is not a suitable first stage because persistent forces are likely to shape both
migrations and FDI, inducing a correlation between At−1o,d and εo,d.
26 Therefore, an IV strategy
following Card (2001), using variations in I to and A
t−1
o,d as instruments, would not be suitable.
We address this challenge by using the recursive structure of equation (2). Given that our
data cover the vast majority of migration to the United States (more than 70 million immigrants,
including the entire first and second generation of immigrants alive in 1880), we assume the initial
















where the constant do,s only contains information on total migrations from o in previous periods.
This specification suggests plausibly exogenous variation in I to (I
t
d/I
t) would allow the construc-
tion of an instrument for A2010o,d . By interacting a push factor, I
t
o, not specific to destination d
but to all destinations in the United States, and a pull factor, I td/I
t, not specific to country o
but to migrants from all countries, this formulation already rules out most plausible sources of
endogeneity. However, our exclusion restriction could still be violated if I to,d, or migrations from






To address these concerns, we exclude migrants to d’s census region from the push factor (we
26In the example above, a favorable climate for growing wine induces both migrations from Italy to Napa in
1900-30, a high At−1o,d term, and many Italy-Napa wine making multinationals in 2014, resulting in a high εo,d.
14
replace I to by I
t
o,−r(d) in (3), where −r (d) means outside of d’s census region), and migrants from
o’s continent from the pull factor (we replace I td/I
t by I t−c(o),d/I
t
−c(o) in (3), where −c (o) means
outside of o’s continent). Our first-stage specification is thus













o,dγ + ηo,d, (4)
where
∑5
n=1 δnPCn stands for the first five principal components summarizing the information
contained in the 758 higher-order terms Iso,−r(d) · · · I to,−r(d)I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o),∀t < s ≤ 2010.27









It requires that any confounding factors that make destination d more attractive for FDI from
origin o do not simultaneously affect the interaction of the settlement of migrants from other
continents with the total number of migrants from o settling in a different census region.
To further relax this assumption, most of our specifications also control for interactions of
fixed effects that are symmetric to the construction of our instruments: the interaction between
destination and continent-of-origin fixed effects (δd × δc(o)) and the interaction between origin
and destination-census-region fixed effects (δo× δr(d)). These specifications are, by construction,
robust to any confounding factors that operate within an origin-continent - destination-census-
region pair. (In our example above, wine makers from Europe migrating to the West Coast.)
3.2 The First-Stage Relationship
Table 2 shows our basic first-stage estimates of (4). Column 1 is the most parsimonious speci-
fication regressing our measure of ancestry on origin and destination fixed effects and the nine
simple interaction terms {I to,−r(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))}t. To interpret each coefficient as the marginal
effect of migrations in a given period, without affecting the fit of the first stage, we sequentially










−c(o)) on the same interaction in 1880 and 1900.
All nine coefficients shown in column 1 are positive, and seven are statistically significant at
27Principal component analysis (eigenvalue decomposition) is simply a means for compactly summarizing the
variation contained in the 758 higher-order terms. In our standard specification, the first five components sum-
marize 99.99% of the variation. To the extent that the higher order terms are valid instruments, the first five
principal components are valid instruments as well. Our results are robust to adding these terms or not.
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the 1% level (Appendix Figure 1 depicts the coefficients graphically; Appendix Figure 4 depicts
the fit of each coefficient). Even our earliest (pre-1880) snapshot of the cross-sectional variation
in economic attractiveness to new migrants has left a significant imprint on the present-day
ancestry composition of US counties. The overall pattern of coefficients suggests a hump-shape,
where very recent waves of migrants have a smaller impact on current ancestry than migrations a
few decades back, but the effect of past migrations eventually fades after about one century. An
exception to the general pattern is the smaller and insignificant coefficient for 1920-30. A likely
explanation is the Great Depression, which induced large reverse migrations of recently arrived
migrants, demonstrating our model is less well suited for periods with negative net migration.
Taken together, the nine simple interactions incrementally increase the R2 of the regression
by 4 percentage points and explain about 9% of the variation in ancestry not explained by origin
and destination fixed effects. Column 2 controls for distance and latitude difference. Columns 3
and 4 add destination × continent-of-origin and origin × destination-census-region fixed effects,
respectively. Columns 1-4 estimate (4) under the restriction that the recursive factor is irrelevant
(dt = 0 in (2)). We relax this in column 5 and add the principal components of the higher
order interaction terms. Column 6 includes third-order polynomials in the distance and latitude
difference between o and d. Column 7 includes migration data from the 2005-2010 ACS survey.
Column 8 drops migration prior to 1880. Column 9 estimates (4) in levels rather than logs.
Our standard specification is in column 5. The Kleibergen-Papp Wald rk-statistic against the
null of weak identification is 162.2, well above the Stock and Yogo critical values.28 We reject
the null that our instruments are jointly irrelevant in the first stage across all specifications.
3.3 Instrumental Variables Results
In our IV estimation, we explicitly test the hypothesis that an increase in the number of descen-
dants from a given origin increases the probability that at least one local firm engages in FDI
with that country. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if either a parent foreign
firm from origin country o owns a US subsidiary in destination US county d (inward FDI), or if
a US parent in d owns a foreign subsidiary in o (outward FDI). The results are in Table 3.
In column 1 we estimate equation (1) while instrumenting (the log of) ancestry in 2010 with
the simple interaction terms {I to,−r(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))}t and controlling for origin and destination
fixed effects, distance, and latitude difference. The coefficient estimate on ancestry is 0.231
(s.e.=0.023), statistically significant at the 1% level. Appendix Figure 2 shows the corresponding
28The Hansen J test statistic is 15.891 with a p-value of 0.255. We thus fail to reject the null that our instruments
are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the second-stage regression.
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reduced form results graphically. All nine coefficients are greater than zero, and seven of them
are statistically significant at the 5% level. Destinations that received an (exogenous) increase in
the number of migrants from a given origin in any of the nine consecutive waves of immigration
thus tend to have a significantly higher probability of engaging in FDI with that origin today.
The coefficient of interest falls slightly to 0.190 (s.e.=0.024) in column 2 when we add the first
five principal components of the higher-order interactions to our set of instruments. Column 3
shows our standard specification. The estimate, 0.187 (s.e.=0.024), implies that doubling the
number of residents with ancestry from a given origin relative to the sample mean (from 316
to 632) increases by 4 percentage points the probability that at least one firm engages in FDI
with that origin.29 This specification includes destination × continent-of-origin fixed effects and
origin × destination-census-region fixed effects. Reassuringly, adding these 17,460 fixed effects
has almost no effect on our coefficient of interest (0.187, s.e.=0.024 versus 0.190, s.e.=0.024).
Comparing this estimate with the same column in panel B shows that it is about 25% larger
than the corresponding OLS coefficient. The endogenous assignment of migrants within the
United States thus appears to induce a downward bias in the OLS coefficient, consistent with a
simple extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model: migrations tend to be driven by differences in
factor endowments (creating differences in wages between origin country and destination county),
while FDI flows are driven by similarities in factor endowments (as firms use FDI to export their
technology to countries with a similar mix of factor endowments).30
Another useful way to gauge the relative importance of ancestry is its partial R2 relative to
the other controls. Taken together, the standard gravity terms, that is, the origin and destination
fixed effects, distance, and latitude difference, explain 20.3% of the variation in the FDI Dummy.
Adding ancestry to these variables in a simple OLS specification (panel B) raises the R2 by 9
percentage points, half as much variation as the combined explanatory power of the economic
fundamentals reflected in the gravity terms (although this effect is not necessarily causal).31
The remaining columns of Table 3 probe the robustness of this result. Column 4 adds a third-
degree polynomial in distance and latitude difference to capture non-linear effects of distance;
column 5 adds an interaction term for the contemporaneous 2010 migrations in the first stage
29 Using βˆ = 0.187 from column 3 in Table 3 in equation (1), we have: 1 [FDIo,d > 0|Ancestryo.d = 632] −





)− ln (1 + 3161000)) ≈ 0.0402. An IV probit estimate of the
same specification yields a marginal effect of Log Ancestry 2010 on Pr [FDI > 0] of 0.104 (s.e.=0.037).
30Naturally, the OLS coefficient may also be biased downward simply because ancestry is measured with error.
31Instead adding our nine simple interactions to the standard gravity terms, thus running the most parsimonious
reduced form, raises the R2 by 1.5 percentage points, and adding them in combination with the five principal
components by 2 percentage points. These numbers are a lower bound on the importance of common ancestry
for FDI, since it only accounts for the part of the causal effect of ancestry which is picked up by our instruments.
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(as in column 7 of Table 2); and column 6 adds a more stringent set of origin × destination-
state fixed effects, exploiting only variation within US states. The coefficient estimate remains
remarkably stable and highly statistically significant across specifications.
3.4 The Communist Natural Experiment & Alternative Instruments
The main potential challenge to these results is that, despite our best efforts, confounding factors
that make a destination more attractive for both migration and FDI from a given origin may still,
in some complicated way, be correlated with our instruments, although they only use information
about migrations from other continents and to other census regions. In this section, we address
this challenge using a natural experiment and a set of alternative instrumentation strategies.
Communist Natural Experiment. We begin by combining our IV with a natural experi-
ment that allows us to focus on changes in FDI and changes in ancestry: the periods of economic
isolation between the United States and communist countries during parts of the 20th century.
These periods are 1918-90 for the Soviet Union, 1945-80 for China, 1975-96 for Vietnam, and
1945-89 for Eastern Europe (the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw pact). They provide a useful
experiment for two reasons. First, we can confidently assume the prospect of FDI, outlawed for
political reasons, did not drive migrations during those periods (ruling out reverse causality).
Second, the specification is similar to a difference-in-difference, measuring how cross-sectional
variations in ancestry driven only by the inflow of migrants over a period of exclusion explain
changes in FDI, from zero during the exclusion period to its current level in 2014.
Table 4 shows estimates of (1) for each of these countries or sets of countries, using as
instruments only migration waves that occurred during the period of isolation. For each country,
we find a large and significant causal impact of ancestry on FDI that is remarkably similar to
our full-sample estimates from Table 3. (For example, 0.185 (s.e.=0.019) for the Soviet Union
alone versus 0.187 (s.e.=0.024) in our standard specification from Table 3.) An exception to
this rule is Vietnam, which shows a coefficient less than half the size of the other cases (0.089,
s.e.=0.036). Plausibly, this lower coefficient reflects the fact that the majority of Vietnamese
immigrants who arrived during the 1975-96 period were granted entry for aiding the US cause
during the Vietnam war, and the communist government who defeated them is still in power in
2014 and controls FDI. Vietnamese Americans might thus plausibly be in a worse position than
descendants of migrants from other countries to generate FDI between the US and their ancestral
country. Pooling across all former Communist countries, we again find a coefficient very close to
that of our standard specification in Table 3 (0.206, s.e.=0.031). These results strongly suggest
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reverse causality does not drive our results, and our exclusion restriction is likely valid.
Alternative Instruments. The main remaining challenge to our approach is that a common
unobserved characteristic of destinations in two different census regions may still directly affect
FDI, while also disproportionately causing large groups of migrants from two origins on two
different continents to systematically migrate at the same time to the same destinations across
multiple census regions (e.g. the Italy-Algeria and Napa-Champlain Valley example above).
If such a confounding factor were driving our results, we would expect that excluding from
the construction of our instruments countries with either correlated migrations, or correlated
ancestry, would have a large effect on the coefficient of interest. We show below they do not.
The first specification in Panel A of Table 5 excludes from the construction of our pull factors
foreign countries that tended to send migrants towards the United States at the same time as a
given origin country. For each pair of countries, we compute the correlation coefficent over time
of aggregate emigration to the US, and exclude from the (o, d, t) pull factor all migrations to d
at t from origin country o′ if the correlation with o is above 0.5 and significant at the 5% level.
Panel A of Appendix Figure 5 shows these correlations graphically: while correlations within
continents (along the diagonal) tend to be larger, there is also a strong correlation in the timing
of migrations between some African, American, and Asian countries.32 Using this alternative
approach, we exclude on average 65 countries, of which on average 18 are in the same continent
(our baseline leave-out category).
The second specification instead excludes from our instruments foreign countries which have
a similar distribution of ancestry within the United States in 2010. For each country pair, we
compute the correlation across destination counties of the number of residents with a given an-
cestry, and again exclude origin countries if the correlation coefficient is above 0.5 and significant
at the 5% level. Panel B shows these correlations graphically, with a strong correlation in the
distribution of ancestry between Asian and European countries. Using this approach, we exclude
on average 36 countries, of which on average 13 are in the same continent.
Panel A of Table 5 shows that our coefficient estimates vary little with these alternative sets of
instruments: 0.181 (s.e.=0.027) when excluding countries with correlated migrations over time;
and 0.217 (s.e.=0.030) when excluding countries with correlated ancestry over space. The coeffi-





rather than the surrounding census region (0.192, s.e.=0.022). Appendix Tables 6 and 7 show
32 Most, if not all, forces that induce such correlations in practice are fully innocuous for our identification.
For example, changes in US immigration laws or innovations in transportation technologies might simultaneously
affect the push factors of several countries. In this sense, there is no general reason to exclude certain countries
with high correlation from the construction of our instruments.
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that the same is true across a wide range of similar variations in our leave-out categories: our
coefficient estimates remain stable across all variations that exclude at least the own origin-
destination pair. We conclude that our original approach (excluding the own continent-of-origin
and destination-census-region) is valid and that no spurious correlations are driving our results.
Panel B of Table 5 presents results using subsets of our instruments. The first row uses as
instruments only the simple interactions from the first half of the time period covered by our
migration data (1880-1930), the second row only from the second half (1970-2010), while the
third row excludes migrations from the first census (1880) from the set of our instruments, as
these might be more related to stocks than flows. The coefficient of interest again remains stable
at 0.209 (s.e.=0.037), 0.175 (s.e.=0.021), and 0.187 (s.e.=0.024) respectively.33 Appendix Table 8
replicates our results using data on FDI from 2007 rather than 2014 and data on ancestry from
2000 rather than 2010, again with little effect on our results. We conclude that our results are
not driven by specific vintages of migrations, pre-, post-WWII, or other.
3.5 Additional Robustness Checks & Intensive Margin
Functional Form. In our main specification, we measure our ancestry variable as the log







. In Appendix Table 9, we offer a formal test to justify this choice of
functional form by performing a non-linear least squares estimation of




+X ′o,dγ + εo,d, (6)
again including the same covariates as in our simple specification from column 2 in Table 3. We
find a point estimate of β = 0.1683 and pi = 0.0010. This finding forms the basis for our choice of
functional form applied throughout the paper. This functional form is convenient because it offers
a compact way to model the non-linear impact of ancestry. For small ancestry (Ancestryo,d 
1000), the function ln (1 + Ancestryo,t/1000) is approximately linear in Ancestryo,d. For large
ancestry (Ancestryo,d  1000), it behaves approximatively like ln(Ancestryo,d). So for a small
number of residents with foreign ancestry o, (1) means that increasing ancestry by 1,000 increases
the probability of at least one FDI link to o by β percentage points; for a large number of residents
with ancestry from o, increasing ancestry by 1% increases the probability of at least one FDI
link by β percentage points. Appendix Figure 6 plots the average number of FDI links across
centiles of the distribution of ancestry, and shows the effect of ancestry on FDI is highly concave.
33The first two coefficients are not statistically different; the p-value for a test of equality is 0.202.
20
In Appendix Table 10, we further sow the robustness of our results to using a range of
alternative functional forms, and to using measures of ancestry from the, 1980, 1990 and 2000
censuses, instead of 2010. Appendix Table 11 shows our main results are robust to varying the
cutoff for ownership at which we consider a foreign firm to be a subsidiary or parent (from 5%
to 50%). Appendix Table 8 shows our results are robust to using FDI in 2007 (instead of 2014).
Standard Errors. Appendix Table 12 shows our standard specification from column 3 of
Table 3 using alternative standard errors. It reports robust standard errors; standard errors
clustered by origin, destination, state, continent, and state-country cells. Among all these sim-
ple analytic standard errors, clustering by origin, as we do throughout the paper, is the most
conservative choice. Doing so allows for arbitrary correlation in the error term across multiple
destinations for a given origin, including for spatial correlation of errors. The specification we
use throughout the paper thus allows for more flexible patterns of spatial correlation than for
example the standard error correction as proposed by Conley (1999).
A possible concern is that errors may still be correlated across origin countries. However, stan-
dard errors designed to adjust for such correlations (clustering by county or state) are narrower,
suggesting that any such patterns in the error structure are – if they were present – absorbed
by the rich set of fixed effects and controls contained in our standard specification. Consistent
with this view, the table also shows that standard errors double clustered at county-plus-country
and state-plus-country level, as well as various block-bootstrapped standard errors are either
narrower or only very marginally wider than those in our standard specification. The conclusion
that our results are robust to alternative standard error specifications also carries over to the
other main results of our paper (see Appendix Table 13).
An alternative approach to detecting any tendency to over-reject the null is to reassign the
“treatment” to a different set of outcome observations, in the spirit of Fisher’s randomization
inference procedure. We assign the interaction between push and pull factors for country o
to randomly selected other countries and calculate the t-statistic on the coefficient of interest.
Reassuringly, across 1000 random assignments, the t-statistic rejects the null of no treatment
effect in favour of the alternative of a positive treatment effect in only 2.7% of the cases.
Placebo Tests. To assess whether our instrument reliably isolates push factors specific to
only one country, or is correlated with omitted variables that affect FDI with other countries,
Appendix Table 14 assigns the interaction between push and pull factors for a given origin to a
quasi-randomly selected other country: its nearest neighbor in alphabetic order (panel A), or its
nearest neighbor in alphabetic order in a different continent (panel B). The coefficient estimates
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are always near zero and statistically insignificant, suggesting our instrument is not picking up
any artificial correlation (positive or negative) between the push factors for different countries.
Robustness in Sub-Samples & Heterogeneous Effects. Figure 4 shows results from
separate regressions for all 112 origin countries (left panel) and the 100 largest US counties (right
panel).34 Each figure is a funnel plot of the country/country-specific coefficients on ancestry
against the reciprocal of their standard errors, where the circles reflect the relative shares in
ancestry and US population, respectively. The coefficients are significant at the 5% level for 84
out of 112 countries and 99 out of 100 counties. This further demonstrates that our results are
not driven by any specific subsample or outliers.
Inward and Outward FDI. We estimate our standard specification from column 3 of
Table 3 separately for inward FDI, a dummy equal to 1 if at least one firm in US county d is
a subsidiary of a parent in foreign country o, and for outward FDI, a dummy equal to 1 if at
least one firm in US county d is the parent of a subsidiary in foreign country o. The coefficients
for both outward and inward FDI are positive, statistically significant, and close to our baseline
estimates. We find a somewhat stronger impact of ancestry on outward FDI, βout ≈ 0.2, than
on inward FDI, βin ≈ 0.15, although the coefficients are not statistically different.
The Intensive Margin of FDI. Figure 5 shows ancestry has a positive and significant
impact on the intensive margin of FDI (the number of foreign subsidiaries), with no obvious
outliers, for the largest countries and counties in our sample: Germany and Britain (top parts),
and LA and Cook counties (bottom parts). Appendix Table 19 systematically estimates the
impact of ancestry on the intensive margin of FDI,




o,dγ + ζo,d. (7)
where FDIo,d corresponds to various measures of the volume of FDI between o and d and where
we instrument A2010o,d with the same first-stage equation (4) as earlier.
35 We use various measures
for the volume of FDI: in panel A, the total number of FDI relationships; in panel B, the number
34Appendix Figure 7 shows a similar figure for six individual sector groups. Appendix Table 15 shows results
from separate regressions for the five largest origins (by number of descendants, panel A) and destinations (in total
number of foreign ancestry, panel B). Appendix Tables 16, 17, and 18 show the results from separate regressions
for all countries, all sectors, six sector groups, and small and large firms.
35To correct the selection bias from dropping log(zero)’s, we implement a Heckman (1979) correction, as in
Helpman et al. (2008). We first estimate an IV probit regression at the extensive margin,










with A2010o,d instrumented as in equation (4). We extract the predicted latent variable that determines non-zero
FDI, zˆo,d = Φ
−1 (ρˆo,d), and include the inverse Mills ratio µˆo,d = ϕ (zˆo,d) /Φ (zˆo,d) within our set Xo,d of controls.
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of firms in d which are a subsidiary of a firm in o, a measure of inward FDI; and in panel C, the
total local employment in county d at subsidiaries of firms in o.
Across all specifications, we find a positive impact of ancestry on the volume of FDI. The
effect of ancestry on the intensive margin of FDI, the coefficient κ in (7), is statistically and
economically significant across most specifications: doubling the number of residents in county
d who report ancestry from country o (from the mean, 316, to 632) increases the number of FDI
relationships by 6.5% and local employment at subsidiaries of foreign firms by 7.3%.36 More
descendants of foreign migrants increases the likelihood that local firms engage in FDI, the
number of firms that do so, and the local employment by foreign-owned firms.
Trade versus FDI. In Appendix Table 20, we test whether ancestry has a similar impact
on the intensive margin of FDI (panel A) as on trade (exports in panel B, and imports in panel
C). We use readily available data on trade flows between US states and foreign countries sourced
from the US Census Bureau. We again instrument for the composition of ancestry as in (4),
except that all variables are defined at the state, not county, level. We correct for the selection
bias due to zero trade using a Heckman (1979) correction as above.
The impact of ancestry on FDI at the state-level is positive, significant, and larger than on
trade, once we instrument and include both origin and destination effects (column 3).37 The
effect of ancestry on trade becomes indistinguishable from zero in our preferred specification
in column 3. Although we interpret this non-result with due caution due to the limited data
available, it contrasts with earlier findings in the literature, started by the seminal contributions
of Gould (1994) and Rauch and Trindade (2002) (using OLS), and the recent IV results of Cohen
et al. (2015) for trade with Japan, and Parsons and Vezina (2016) for trade with Vietnam, that
all find the presence of migrants facilitates exports. Our preferred specification shows no such
positive and statistically significant effect. A closer look at the data suggests two important
features are essential in reaching this negative conclusion: when either a formal identification
is missing (OLS in column 1), or no control for destination—US state—fixed effect is included
(column 2), we erroneously find a positive and significant estimated impact of ancestry on trade.
But when both are present (column 3 panels B and C), we find none.
Ancestry and Immigration. According to our reduced-form model (2), migrations are
driven by economic attractiveness (the interaction of our pull and push factors) and the stock of
36Using κˆ = 0.326 in panel C, column 3 of Appendix Table 19 in equation (7), we have:
Employmento,d[Ancestryo,d=2×316]
Employmento,d[Ancestryo,d=316]
− 1 = exp (0.326 (ln (1 + 2×3161000 )− ln (1 + 3161000)))− 1 ≈ 0.073.
37In unreported robustness checks, we find similar results for other years, or when restricting our analysis only
to trade in manufacturing goods, where determining the final destination (origin) of an import (export) is less
subject to measurement error, as well as for separate regressions for final goods and for intermediate inputs.
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ancestry (the recursive factor). To provide direct evidence for these two forces, we estimate







o,dγ + ϑo,d (8)
for t = 2000, 1990 (the census years for which we have information on lagged ancestry), where we
again instrument for At−1o,d using (4). Column 1 of Table 6, Panel A estimates (8) with immigration
I to,d in levels, and (reassuringly) gives a coefficient on the interaction of the push and pull factors
close to 1. Columns 2 and 3 estimate (8) in logs for two time periods, 1990 and 2000. Across
all specifications, both the coefficient on the push × pull interaction and on lagged ancestry are
positive and significant predictors of current migrations.
In Panel B of Table 6, we show recent changes in FDI are predicted by recent changes in
ancestry. In column 1, we add a dummy for FDI in 2007 (the earliest year for which we have
data) to our standard specification from column 3 of Table 3, so that the coefficient of interest
now reflects the effect of ancestry on changes in the extensive margin of FDI between 2007 and
2014.38 As expected, we find a smaller, but nevertheless positive coefficient (0.086, s.e.=0.018).
Column 2 shows almost identical results when using only migrations between 1980 and 2000 for
identification. Column 3, shows the same effect at the intensive margin (0.142, s.e.=0.049).
3.6 Quantifying the Effect of Ancestry on FDI
We illustrate the quantitative implications of our findings using two thought experiments. First,
we estimate how FDI linkages with China might have evolved if Chinese migrants had not been
effectively barred from entering the United States between 1882 and 1965. Second, we report
how FDI in Los Angeles might have evolved if Los Angeles had had an influx of migrants in the
1800s similar to that resulting from the San Francisco Gold Rush. These thought experiments
are not meant as formal counterfactuals, but merely as illustrations of the magnitude of the
long-term effect of immigration policies on FDI implied by our estimates.
The Effect of Chinese Exclusion. The US government passed the Chinese Exclusion Act
into law in 1882 in response to increased immigration from China, essentially closing the United
States to legal immigration of laborers from China. In 1943, it was replaced by the Magnuson
Act, which allocated a quota of 105 immigrants per year from China, and was in effect until
1965, when the removal of the quota system allowed for large-scale Chinese immigration for the
first time. We refer to the entire period from 1882 through to 1965 as the period of “Chinese
38The magnitude of this effect should be interpreted with caution as coverage of the ORBIS data has expanded
between 2007 and 2014 so that the size of the effect will reflect both changes in FDI and changes in coverage.
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Exclusion.” How different would the ancestry composition and FDI of US counties be today had
it not been for Chinese Exclusion?
To answer this question we require an estimate for the impact of Chinese exclusion on the
number of immigrants from China. We use our own data to derive a rough estimate. We
aggregate our immigration data at the time × census-region × origin level and estimate I to,r =
δt,r+δo−ξ ·DtChina+νt,o,r, where DtChina is a dummy equal to 1 if o = China and t ∈ [1882, 1965],
and δt,r and δo are time × census region and origin fixed effects, respectively. The coefficient
ξˆ can then be interpreted as the estimated average negative impact of the Chinese Exclusion
Act on Chinese migrations. We then calculate a hypothetical time path of immigration in the
absence of Chinese exclusion as I˜ to,r ≡ I to,r + ξˆ ·DtChina. It suggests that the United States would
have received 1.8 million additional Chinese immigrants during the period of exclusion.
Given this hypothetical time path of immigration we can then use our estimates from Table 2








, where αˆt are the
estimated first-stage coefficients. The hypothetical change of FDI relations with China at the
county level is dPr [FDIo,d > 0] ≡ βˆ · dAo,d, where βˆ is the estimated second-stage coefficient in
a specification as in column 3 in Table 3, excluding the principal components to be consistent
with the above described methodology to predict hypothetical levels of ancestry.
These calculations suggest that the increase in Chinese migration would have been highly
unequally distributed, translating into heterogenous changes in the incidence of FDI relationships
with China. The map in Figure 6 depicts the expected change in the probability of positive FDI
with China, dPr [FDIChina,d > 0]. The absence of Chinese exclusion would have resulted in
substantially stronger FDI ties with the Northeast, the Midwest and the Southwest. The bar
graph depicts the fraction of counties within a state which have positive FDI with China in
2014, and the predicted change in this measure of the extensive margin of FDI linkages, i.e. the
unweighted average of dPr [FDIChina,d > 0] across counties within the state. To save space, the
graph shows only the ten states with the highest predicted change. For example, we predict that
in the absence of Chinese exclusion, the proportion of counties with an FDI link to China would
have doubled in New York, and increased by 60% in Massachusetts and Illinois.39
A Gold Rush in Los Angeles. To similarly gauge the magnitude of the estimated intensive
margin effects, we derive predictions for the intensity of FDI relationships between Los Angeles
county and the world under the hypothetical scenario that Los Angeles had experienced a Gold
39Although we believe, in light of our results, that additional Chinese immigration likely also raises FDI between
China and the United States as a whole, we cannot exclude the possibility that increases in FDI with China in
one state are partially or fully offset by decreases in others.
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Rush similar to that in San Francisco, a fivefold increase in the pre-1880 number of immigrants
to Los Angeles. Appendix Table 21 presents the results of this thought experiment for the 10
foreign countries with the largest predicted change in their ancestry group in Los Angeles in
2010. Columns 1 and 2 show the actual number of individuals of each ancestry in Los Angeles
County in 2010 and the total number of FDI links recorded in our data between Los Angeles
County and the respective origin countries. Columns 3 and 4 present the predictions of our
thought experiment based on the IV specification corresponding to column 2 of Appendix Table
19, again without the principle components as instruments. A Gold Rush in Los Angeles would
have resulted in sizeable effects on the intensity of FDI with those countries that were the source
of immigration pre-1880: the intensity of FDI between Los Angeles county and Germany and
Ireland would have increased by around 60%. Column 4 presents the predicted absolute change
in the size of the ancestry groups, based on a reduced form regression analogous to column 9
of Table 2 with Ancestry 2010 (in levels) as outcome variable, again excluding the principle
components. It suggests that the population of Irish and German descent living in Los Angeles
county today would each be counting about 60,000 more individuals.
4 Understanding the Effect of Ancestry
So far, we have documented a quantitatively large causal effect of common ancestry on FDI. We
now turn to the mechanism linking ancestry to FDI. Existing research suggests that migrations
and common ancestry may affect FDI either by making the destination more “similar” to the
origin in terms of preferences and skill endowments or by generating social capital that creates
an absolute advantage for firms to operate in both the origin and destination country.
In the first category, Atkin (2010) and Bronnenberg et al. (2012) suggest that descendants
of migrants may share the same tastes for foods and other products as consumers in their origin
country. To the extent that these tastes persist over generations, firms that cater to those tastes
may serve both markets. Similarly, we might suspect that migrants may bring with them a
specific skill-mix or other factors abundant in their origin country, so that firms can more easily
outsource production, using the same skill-mix at home and abroad.
In the second category, common ancestry may create an absolute advantage in conducting FDI
for local firms, because social ties between populations in the origin and the destination provide
social collateral that helps to enforce contracts when the legal system of o or d is imperfect (Greif,
1993; Besley and Coate, 1995). Alternatively, migrants and descendants of migrants from a given
origin may have privileged access to information (Varian, 1990; Stiglitz, 1990): a more intimate
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knowledge of the business environment in their origin country and social ties or language skills
that provide access to information about business opportunities and practices at a lower cost.
The following section presents evidence testing auxiliary predictions of these distinct channels.
The collection of these results suggests that ancestry affects FDI primarily because it creates an
absolute advantage for local firms by attenuating information frictions.
4.1 Channel Linking Ancestry to FDI
Panels A-C of Table 7 present indirect tests for the ‘similarities’ hypothesis. Panel A shows the IV
coefficient of ancestry on FDI separately for firms producing final goods and for firms producing
intermediate inputs.40 If common tastes were the explanation behind the positive impact of
ancestry on FDI, we would expect its impact to be stronger for final goods, for which consumers’
tastes matter directly, than for intermediate inputs, for which tastes matter little. We find, on
the contrary, that there is no significant difference between final goods and intermediate input
producers; if anything, the point estimate is slightly larger for intermediate input producers than
for final goods producers. Panel B shows similar results for inward FDI only, where the local
tastes of descendants from country o may plausibly matter more.
Panel C of Table 7 shows the IV coefficients of a regression of ancestry on measures of sectoral
similarity between the origin and the destination. For each origin-destination pair, we compute
the rank and cosine correlation of the shares of employees in 127 manufacturing sectors.41 Both
correlations increase with the similarity of the allocation of employees across sectors between the
origin and destination. If skill similarities were the explanation behind the positive impact of
ancestry on FDI, we would expect common ancestry to cause an increase in these measures. We
find, on the contrary, that ancestry has no discernible impact on sectoral similarity. This non-
result—migrations do not cause a convergence in the sectoral composition of employment—is
robust to using alternative measures of sectoral similarity, as well as alternative data sources.42
Panel D of Table 7 examines the contract enforcement channel. If contract enforcement were
the explanation behind the positive impact of ancestry on FDI, we would expect the impact to
be stronger for countries where the quality of the local judiciary is weaker, as ethnic ties would
40We use the upstreamness index from Antra`s et al. (2012) to define sectors producing final versus intermediate
goods: a sector is labelled as final goods (intermediate input) if its upstreamness index is below (above) 2.
41We use county and country level industry data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the UN
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), respectively. Correlations are calculated for 2006, the year with
the largest availability of data (28 countries). Using this smaller sample of countries, the coefficient on ancestry
in our standard specification linking ancestry to FDI is 0.348 (s.e.=0.046).
42Results are unchanged whether we use rank or cosine correlation, or when we repeat the same exercise using
the OECD Stan country level industry data.
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substitute for weak institutions. We find the opposite result in columns 1 (extensive margin)
and 2 (intensive margin), where we add the interaction of ancestry with a measure of the origin
country’s judicial quality taken from Nunn (2007) to our simple IV specification of column 2
in Table 3. The coefficients show that the effect of ancestry on FDI is significantly larger for
countries with good institutions than for countries with bad institutions, suggesting that common
ancestry and good institutions are complements rather than substitutes.
We conclude from Table 7 that the data show no evidence for the ‘similarities’ hypothesis and
that our results do not seem driven by ethnic ties substituting for poor contract enforcement.
4.2 Information Demand
To directly test the remaining hypothesis that common ancestry affects FDI by reducing in-
formation frictions, we require data on the flow of information from foreign countries to US
destinations. Because such data is not readily available we construct a simple index of differen-
tial information demand using data from internet searches.43 The Google Trends portal provides
data on the relative popularity of different search terms across 210 US metropolitan areas (“me-
dia markets” according to the Nielsen DMA definition).44 For each search term i and US metro
area d, the portal returns an index number that is equal to the normalized share of searches





maxδ{share(i, δ)}1[#(i, d) > T ]
]
,
where share(i, d) is the share of searches in d that contains i and 1[#(i, d) > T ] is an indicator
function that is one if the absolute number of searches containing i in d is greater than some
threshold number (Stephens-Davidowitz and Varian, 2015; Liang, 2017).45 Thus, G(i, d) is equal
to 100 in the metro area in which the largest share of searches contain i and a positive number
smaller than 100 in all other metro areas that have a sufficient number of searches containing i.
To measure the relative demand in a given metro area for information about a given origin
country, we compile a list of the five most prominent actors, athletes, musicians, and politicians
for each origin country. We automate this process by searching for “notable [country] [category]”
and then extracting the five top suggested names from the Google Answer Box, a feature of
43We thank Jack Liang for writing his Bachelor Thesis at the University of Chicago on this topic.
44For other recent studies using this data source see Da et al. (2011), Stephens-Davidowitz (2014), Kearney
and Levine (2015), and Baker and Fradkin (2016).
45As a result of this cutoff, our index tends to assign a value of zero to small origin-destination pairs (38% of
our sample). For this reason we focus our attention on the 100 largest origin countries by 2015 population and
do not attempt to construct it for all present-day origin countries.
28
Google search that automatically suggests the most often clicked names associated with this









where q(o, p) is the set of top five names for country o in category p ∈ {actors, athletes,...}. We
implement this procedure for the 100 largest foreign countries by 2015 population. To facilitate
the interpretation of results, we standardize this measure to a unit standard deviation.
Panel A of Table 8 shows the results of regressions of our differential information demand
index on ancestry (instrumented as in (4)), and our standard set of controls at the metropolitan
area - country level. Column 1 documents a large causal effect of ancestry on information demand
(0.871, s.e.=0.257), where doubling the number of descendants of migrants from a given origin
relative to the mean is associated with a 0.19 standard deviation increase in our index of demand
for information about prominent actors, athletes, musicians, and politicians in that origin.4748
Columns 2 and 3 show that this effect remains positive and statistically highly significant even
when we control for the foreign-born population (first-generation immigrants), and when we
condition only on ancestry in 1980 (rather than 2010). Taken together, these results suggest
that the differential interest in information about the origin country persists among the US-
born descendants of first-generation migrants. The remaining columns show that this persistent
interest in the origin country is not limited to politics, but is similar across our four sub-indices
for demand for information about actors, athletes, musicians, and politicians.
The longevity of the effect of ancestry on differential information demand suggests that im-
migrants pass traits to their descendants that facilitate or encourage the exchange of information
with their origin countries, such as social ties to family or friends, or knowledge of the origin
country’s language and culture. Although data on such traits is generally hard to come by at
the required level of disaggregation, Panel B shows one additional piece of evidence from the
US census: the use of foreign languages. The table shows systematic evidence that a larger
community in county d with ancestry from country o has a positive and significant impact on
the number of residents in d who speak o’s language at home (column 1). This effect persists
46See Appendix Table 22 for the full list of search terms used for Germany and Italy as examples. Liang (2017)
shows evidence that search terms with multiple meanings (e.g. two prominent politicians from two different
countries share the same name) do not impact our results, and gives a detailed account demonstrating that the
Google Answer Box generally delivers relevant search terms for each country. See Appendix A.4 for details.





)− ln (1 + 3161000)) = 0.19.
48Complimentary evidence to ours is provided in Bailey et al. (2016), who find that recent immigrations from
origin country o to US county d, as well as the composition of ancestry across US counties d, are close correlates
of a measure of social ties derived from Facebook friendship links.
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if we remove from d’s population all foreign-borns, since they ‘mechanically’ speak the foreign
language from their home country (column 2). Columns 4-6 present the results from separate
regressions for large non-English languages: Spanish, Arabic, Chinese and Hindi.49 The effect of
ancestry on foreign languages spoken is positive and statistically significant for all four.
4.3 Ancestry, Information Flow, and FDI
We next ask whether these differences in information flows can account for the the link between
ancestry and FDI. We get a superficial answer to this question in Appendix Table 24 by running
our simple specification relating ancestry to FDI (column 2 in Table 3), while controlling for
our information demand index. We find that the coefficient on ancestry drops to close to zero
and becomes statistically insignificant (-0.025, s.e.=0.028), while the coefficient on information
demand remains positive and highly statistically significant (0.078, s.e.=0.013). By contrast,
controlling for sectoral similarity and the various other channels probed above has no effect on
the causally identified coefficient on ancestry. Our results thus suggest the effect of ancestry on
FDI transits through the information channel. We study next the mechanisms through which
information transmission may generate an absolute advantage in conducting FDI.
Network effects of common ancestry. Theoretical models emphasize the role of net-
works in facilitating the percolation of information across international borders (Arkolakis, 2010;
Chaney, 2014). This class of models tends to predict effects that are concave (as all the relevant
information is gradually exhausted), weaker if many people from the same or neighboring origins
live in the surrounding area (as relevant information is more likely to have already percolated),
and stronger for destinations that are more ethnically diverse (hubs open up more paths for
information to percolate through). We test each of these reduced-form predictions.
We have already shown in section 3.5 that the relationship between ancestry and FDI is
concave (see Appendix Figure 6). Information percolation on a network also suggests negative
spillovers from neighboring regions: if many people with ancestry from o live in locations sur-
rounding d, or if many people in o have an ancestry from countries adjacent to o, it is more likely
that relevant information about investment opportunities has already reached the firm, so that
the marginal impact of ancestry on FDI is mitigated. In Table 9, panel A, column 1, we use
our simple specification from column 2 in Table 3, but add the total number of descendants of
ancestry o at the state level. We are able to identify the effect of this spillover at the state level
by aggregating our instruments from equation (4) to the state level and including them as a sep-
49Appendix Table 23 presents the regression coefficients of ancestry on foreign languages for the 50 largest
linguistic groups.
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arate set of instruments, such that both endogenous variables are identified. The coefficient on
our measure of ancestry at the state level is -0.015 (s.e.=0.004), suggesting a negative and signif-
icant spillover. In column 2 we include a measure of the number of descendants from the closest
neighboring country, and we again find a negative and highly significant spillover effect.50 Our
findings are thus consistent with the presence of negative spillovers within co-ethnic networks.
In columns 3 and 4, we repeat the same estimation for the intensive margin of FDI, but in
this much smaller sample we lack the statistical power to identify a consistent pattern.
An additional prediction of network-based models is the existence of hubs, dense locations
through which distant locations can connect. If such hub-effects were at work, we would expect
the effect of ancestry on FDI to be larger in more ethnically diverse destinations. We test
this prediction in panel B of Table 9. We interact ancestry with a measure of ethnic diversity
(measured as 1 minus the Herfindhal index of ancestry shares). The coefficient on this interaction
is positive and significant, both at the intensive and the extensive margin (column 2 and 4). By
contrast, we find no effect on the interaction between ancestry and the share of the population
that are of foreign descent (column 1 and 3). This suggests the effect in columns 2 and 4 is
driven by ethnic diversity, not by the size of the population share with foreign descent.
We conclude that the patterns by which ancestry affects FDI are consistent with the auxiliary
predictions of models of network effects, where information (or other effects of social capital) are
transmitted internationally through networks created by common ancestry.
Cost of Information Transmission. If information frictions indeed were the explanation
behind the positive impact of ancestry on FDI, we would also expect this effect to be stronger in
relationships that suffer from higher costs of information transmission. For example, information
costs may be larger for distant countries or countries that are ethnically diverse.
We confirm this prediction in the Panel C of Table 9. In all specifications, the coefficient on
the interaction between ancestry and geographic distance is positive and significant, both for the
extensive (columns 1 and 2) and intensive margins of FDI (columns 3 and 4).51 Columns 2 and
4 also show some evidence that the effect of ancestry on FDI is larger for more ethnically diverse
origins (a higher level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization as defined by Alesina et al. (2003)).52
50We determine the nearest adjacent country by creating country pairs, using a standard optimal non-bipartisan
matching algorithm, such that the average distance between centroids of country pairs is minimised.
51Once we account for this interaction, the interaction terms on genetic, linguistic, and religious distance, as
defined by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015), are statistically insignificant, suggesting geographic distance effectively
summarizes alternative notions of distance in cultural space.
52 Results are virtually identical when we consider outward FDI by itself.
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4.4 Generational Effects
Having already shown in section 3 that historical migrations prior to World War II had causal
effects on FDI that persist to the present day, and that historical migrations predict future
migrations through a recursive factor, we now ask whether the effect of ancestry on FDI requires
a sustained inflow of migrants from the same origin—or if it persists even after migration from
that origin ceases. Appendix Table 25 compares the (causally identified) effect of ancestry to
that of foreign born, that is, first-generation immigrants. Column 1 replicates our standard
specification for comparison. Column 2 replaces our measure of ancestry in equation (1) with
a measure of foreign born from a given origin alive in 2010, instrumenting as in equation (4).
The effect remains positive and significant (unsurprisingly, as the correlation between the two
variables is 0.59). When we simultaneously include both endogenous variables in the specification,
the coefficient on ancestry remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas
the coefficient on foreign born in 2010 is close to zero and insignificant in the OLS specification
in column 3. In the IV specification in column 4 the coefficient turns slightly negative and
marginally statistically significant. This suggests the presence of the descendants of immigrants
continues to predict FDI even after migrations from the origin cease.
Using the number of foreign born in 1970 as a proxy for second-generation immigrants, column
6 compares the marginal effect of second-generation immigrants to that of the average resident
with foreign ancestry. The coefficient on second-generation immigrants remains positive (albeit
not significant) when we control for descendants of migrants.53 Although these specifications,
disentangling the marginal effects of several endogenous variables, should be interpreted with
caution, they suggest the effect of ancestry on FDI develops over long periods of time, and
possibly peaks with the second, but not the first generation of immigrants.
This finding is consistent with a set of microeconomic studies that show that only those
individuals that advance to managerial positions successfully establish business linkages to their
origin countries (Aleksynska and Peri, 2014); and that it tends to be the second and third
generations of immigrants, that achieve such advancement (Borjas, 2006; Algan et al., 2010).
Simply put, the second generation of immigrants is more likely than the first to be able to act
on any privileged access to information about the origin country.
To conclude, we find a collage of evidence that migration, and the distribution of ancestry that
results from it, has a positive impact on FDI primarily because it reduces information frictions
associated with foreign direct investment. We also find evidence consistent with network effects
53These results hold if we drop migrations from Mexico (the largest origin country in recent decades).
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and the inter-generational transmission of traits that facilitate the flow of information between
the origin country and the US destination on a long-term basis.
Conclusion
The economic effects of migration loom large in public debates about illegal immigration to the
United States and the ongoing flow of migrants to Europe from places such as Syria, Afghanistan,
Africa, and the Balkans. Much of the academic debate on the subject has focused on relatively
short-term consequences on local labor markets and consumer prices (Card, 1990; Cortes, 2008).
We contribute to this debate by showing causally identified evidence that migrations, and the
ethnic diversity they create, also have a long-term effects: They enhance the propensity of firms
based in areas receiving migrants to interact economically with the migrants’ origin countries.
This ethnic determinant of foreign direct investment is large, persists for generations, and seems
to operate primarily through a reduction in information frictions.
With these findings, we shed new light on the economic effects of migrations, and suggest
several promising avenues for future research. First, we document that ethnic diversity increases
the likelihood and intensity of FDI. Because the effect of foreign ancestry on FDI is strongly
concave, receiving migrants from many small ethnic groups generates more FDI than receiving
the same number of migrants from a single ethnic group. In this sense, ethnic diversity creates
an absolute advantage in conducting FDI. A similar argument could potentially be made for the
impact of ethnic diversity on the adoption of foreign technologies or on economic growth.
Second, the effects of historical migrations on economic development are large and long-
lasting. Regions within the United States that received more, often poor, migrants from countries
like Ireland or China more than a century ago, as a result, enjoy significantly stronger economic
ties with these countries today. Taking in migrants today may thus deliver long-term dividends:
International investments follow the paths of historical migrants as much as they follow economic
fundamentals, such as productivity, wage differentials, and tax breaks.
Finally, our identification strategy has a range of applications beyond FDI. For example, our
approach to identification could be used to study the broader impact of migrations on attitudes
towards foreigners of various origins or the effects of migration on long-term economic growth. If
global migration pressures increase further, e.g. due to global climate change, having a detailed
understanding of these impacts is key to devising effective migration policies.
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Australia & New Zealand
Figure 1: Origins of Immigrants to the United States, pre-1880 to 2000
Notes: The left side depicts the share of total immigration to the United States in each census period
for the largest five origin countries of US residents that claim foreign ancestry in the 2010 census:
Germany, Britain, Ireland, Mexico, and Italy. The right side shows the the number of migrants (in










Figure 2: Destinations of Immigrants to the United States, pre-1880 to
2000
Notes: This figure maps immigration flows into US counties by census period. We regress
the number of immigrants into US county d at time t, Itd, on destination county d and year
t fixed effects, and calculate the residuals. The maps’ color coding depicts the residuals’




German descendants in 2010
Italian descendants in 2010
Figure 3: Migrants and Ancestors: Germany Pre-1900 and Italy 1900-1910
Notes: This figure contrasts Italian and German ancestry in 2010 (right panels), and non-European
immigration patterns pre-1900 and 1910-1930 (left panel). The left two panels are created as in Figure
2, restricted to non-European immigration, and the periods pre-1900 and 1910-1930. The right two
panels plot the county level residuals from a regression of log ancestry in 2010 on county, Italy and
Germany fixed effects on the sample of European countries. The maps’ color coding depicts the
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Coefficient Estimate: Counties
Figure 4: Heterogeneous Effects across Countries and Counties
Notes: This figure shows funnel plots of the estimated coefficients and standard errors from separate
IV regressions of the FDI dummy on Log 2010 Ancestry for each origin country (left) and destination
US counties (right). In all regressions, we use {Ito,−r(d)(It−c(o),d/It−c(o))}t=1880..2000 and principal com-
ponents as excluded instruments, and control for log distance as well as latitude difference. x-axis:
estimated coefficients. y-axis: reciprocal of estimated standard errors on ancestry. Circle sizes are
proportional to country ancestry (left) and county population (right). Circles above the y = ±1.96/x
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coef = .36623872, (robust) se = .06396882, t = 5.73
Cook IL
Figure 5: Ancestry and FDI: Germany and Britain; Los Angeles and Cook counties
Notes: The figure shows conditional scatterplots from regressions corresponding to column 3 of Ap-
pendix Table 19, restricted to one origin country (top parts: Germany and Britain) or one destination
county (bottom parts: LA and Cook counties). The solid line depicts the fitted regression line,
controlling for distance and latitude difference. x-axis: predicted log 2010 ancestry. y-axis: log #
of subsidiaries in Germany (top left) and Britain (to right) for firms in each US county, log # of
subsidiaries of LA (bottom left) or Cook county (bottom right) based firms in each origin country.
Figure 6: Thought Experiment: Removing the Chinese Exclusion Act
Notes: The map on the left depicts for each US county the predicted increase in the probability of
having positive FDI relations with China in a counterfactual world where the “Chinese Exclusion”
Act of 1882 had never been passed. Darker colors indicate larger increases. The bar graph on the
right shows the fraction of counties within each state with FDI relations with China (light color) and
the predicted increment in the fraction of counties with FDI relations with China (dark color), which
we calculate as the unweighted average of dPr [FDIChina,d > 0] across counties for the ten US states
with the largest change. We also provide the size of this increase relative to the actual fraction in
percentage terms. The details of this calculation are section 3.6.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
All Ancestry > 0
All Bottom Quintile Top Quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Origin-destination pairs
FDI Dummy 0.018 0.031 0.003 0.127
(0.132) (0.173) (0.052) (0.333)
Ancestry 2010 (in thousands) 0.316 0.575 0.000 2.852
(5.962) (8.036) (0.000) (17.790)
Immigrants between 1990-2000 (in thousands) 0.023 0.042 0.000 0.199
(1.070) (1.443) (0.001) (3.221)
Immigrants between 2000-2010 (in thousands) 0.020 0.036 0.000 0.173
(0.665) (0.898) (0.002) (1.999)
Foreign-born 2010 (in thousands) 0.069 0.125 0.000 0.594
(2.749) (3.708) (0.004) (8.267)
Geographic Distance (km) 9,122.393 8,397.379 9,142.553 7,463.619
(3,802.105) (3,763.718) (4,299.572) (2,986.233)
Latitude Difference (degree) 19.440 16.319 18.915 13.750
(11.312) (10.902) (11.388) (8.807)
# of FDI Relationships 0.196 0.351 0.028 1.620
(5.486) (7.396) (1.461) (16.294)
# of Subsidiaries in Origin 0.033 0.060 0.003 0.270
(1.345) (1.813) (0.281) (3.844)
# of Parents in Destination 0.015 0.027 0.001 0.123
(0.399) (0.537) (0.103) (1.175)
# of Workers Employed at Subsidiary in Origin (in thousands) 0.039 0.069 0.010 0.319
(4.941) (6.661) (1.298) (14.750)
# of Subsidiaries in Destination 0.068 0.122 0.011 0.562
(1.903) (2.565) (0.546) (5.667)
# of Parents in Origin 0.079 0.143 0.012 0.664
(2.282) (3.077) (0.580) (6.811)
# of Workers Employed at Subsidiary in Destination (in thousands) 0.050 0.088 0.027 0.392
(2.798) (3.743) (2.098) (7.895)
Information Demand Index (standardized)* 0.599 0.735 0.197 1.489
(1.000) (1.092) (0.443) (1.448)
N 19,110 14,583 770 4,527
Panel B: Countries
Genetic Distance 0.103 0.084 0.106 0.066
(0.053) (0.041) (0.050) (0.036)
N 155 119 18 25
Linguistic Distance 0.950 0.937 0.990 0.920
(0.110) (0.121) (0.010) (0.114)
N 132 103 8 26
Religious Distance 0.820 0.807 0.923 0.732
(0.129) (0.137) (0.050) (0.128)
N 131 101 8 25
Judicial Quality 0.503 0.537 0.546 0.661
(0.208) (0.214) (0.224) (0.202)
N 144 115 15 26
2010 Country Diversity 0.442 0.405 0.433 0.239
(0.269) (0.256) (0.246) (0.197)
N 162 122 20 27
Panel C: Counties
2010 Share of Population with Foreign Ancestry 0.577 0.577 0.560 0.648
(0.188) (0.187) (0.223) (0.137)
2010 Diversity of Ancestries 0.790 0.789 0.764 0.838
(0.075) (0.075) (0.071) (0.077)
N 3,141 3,137 628 627
Notes: The table presents means (and standard deviations). Variables in Panel A refer to our sample of (country-county) pairs.
Variables in Panel B refer to our sample of countries. Variables in Panel C refer to our sample of counties. Column 1 shows data for all
observations. Columns 2 to 4 show all, the bottom quintile, and the top quintile of observations with positive ancestry, respectively.
In Panel A, the FDI dummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the destination county has either subsidiaries or shareholders in the
origin country. The details of variables in Panel B are given in the Data Appendix. The ancestry-diversity variable is computed as
1 minus the Herfindahl index of ancestry group shares in each county. *The data is at the metropolitan area level.
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Table 2: First-stage: The Effect of Historical Migrations on Ancestry
Log ancestry 2010 Ancestry 2010




0.057*** 0.056*** 0.045*** 0.035*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 2.145***




0.097*** 0.095*** 0.067** 0.068*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.106** 3.634**




0.192*** 0.193*** 0.145*** 0.123*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.132** 0.123** 5.646**




0.205*** 0.209*** 0.176*** 0.174*** 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.249*** 0.276*** 14.726***




0.062 0.061 0.061 0.035 0.079 0.079 0.065* 0.078 11.812***




0.183*** 0.184*** 0.163*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 6.256***




0.173*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.169*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.205** 0.213*** 18.694***




0.123*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.111** 0.101** 0.101** 0.115** 0.102** 10.786***




0.020 0.019 0.026 0.026* 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.039** 0.046*** 5.194***






Kleibergen Wald rk statistic 10.608 10.958 8.327 9.607 162.194 158.125 195.423 142.800 910.331
Stock-Yogo 5% critical values 20.53 20.53 20.53 20.53 21.18 21.18 21.23 21.10 21.18
Stock-Yogo 10% critical values 11.46 11.46 11.46 11.46 11.52 11.52 11.51 11.52 11.52
R2 0.56 0.56 0.66 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.49
N 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude Difference No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination × Continent FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin × Census Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Principal Components No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3rd order poly in dist and lat No No No No No Yes No No No
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates of our first stage equation (4) at the country-county level. All specifications control for
origin and destination fixed effects. Standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered at the origin country level. In columns 1-8
the dependent variable is the log of 1 plus the number of residents of the county in 2010 that report having ancestors in the origin country,
measured in thousands (Log Ancestry 2010 ). In column 9 the dependent variable is the level of ancestry in 2010 (again in thousands). The







stands for the number of migrants from o who settle in destinations not in the same census region as d in period t and I t−c(o),d/I
t
−c(o) for
the fraction of migrants not coming from origins in the same continent as o who settle in county d. Columns 3-9 also include the first five
principal components of higher-order interactions of these factors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Second-stage: The effect of Ancestry on FDI
Panel A: IV FDI 2014 (Dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Ancestry 2010 0.231*** 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.189*** 0.198*** 0.191***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.023) (0.024)
Log Distance 0.007 0.004 0.024 0.009 0.030 0.026 -0.027
(0.010) (0.009) (0.029) (0.033) (0.040) (0.030) (0.027)
N 612495 612495 612495 612495 459150 612495 612300
Panel B: OLS FDI 2014 (Dummy)
Log Ancestry 2010 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.145*** 0.149*** 0.161***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
R2 0.2967 0.2967 0.3635 0.3635 0.3920 0.3635 0.3930
N 612495 612495 612495 612495 459150 612495 612495
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Principal Components No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination × Continent FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin × Census Region FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3rd order poly in dist and lat No No No Yes Yes No No





−c(o)) No No No No No Yes No
Origin × State FE No No No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from IV (Panel A) and OLS (Panel B) regressions of equation (1)
at the country-county level. The dependent variable in all panels is a dummy indicating an FDI relationship be-
tween origin o and destination d in 2014. The main variable of interest is Log Ancestry 2010, instrumented using
various specifications of equation (4). In all columns in Panel A, we include {I to,−r(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))}t=1880,...,2000
as excluded instruments. Columns 3-7 also include the first five principal components of the higher-order in-
teractions of push and pull factors as instruments. To avoid re-calculating the principal components across
specifications, we include the 2010 wave in their calculation for all columns; however, the inclusion of the 2010
wave has essentially no effect on our results. For example, the standard specification in column 3 without includ-
ing the 2010 wave in the calculation of principal components yields 0.187 (0.024). Column 5 also includes the
interaction of the push and pull factor constructed using data from the 2006-2010 American Community Survey.
All specifications control for log distance, latitude difference, origin, and destination fixed effects. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the origin country level. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. (We also run an IV probit regression using
the specification in column 2 yielding a marginal effect evaluated at the mean of Log Ancestry 2010 on FDI
equal to 0.104***(0.037).)
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Table 4: The Effect of Ancestry on FDI: The Communist Natural Experiment
FDI 2014 (Dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Ancestry 2010 0.185*** 0.237*** 0.089** 0.172*** 0.209***
(0.019) (0.024) (0.036) (0.021) (0.032)
N 3,141 3,141 3,141 18,846 28,269
Destination FE No No No No Yes
Origin FE No No No Yes Yes
Countries considered Soviet Union China Vietnam Eastern Europe All communist countries
Period of ec. isolation 1918-1990 1945-1980 1975-1996 1945-1989
Instruments from 1920-1990 1970-1980 1980-1990 1970-1980
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from IV regressions of equation (1) at the country-county level.
The estimates correspond to column1 of Table 3 except in the inclusion of fixed effects, which is specified.
Each column uses data from a subset of origin countries: Soviet Union (column 1), China (column 2), Vietnam
(column 3), as well as Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania (column 4). The
dependent variable in all columns is a dummy indicating an FDI relationship between origin country o and
destination county d in 2014. In all specifications the instruments are constructed as in column 3 of Table
3; however, we only include as instruments interaction terms containing measures of pull and push factors in
migrations that occur during the years of economic isolation from the United States indicated above. The
remaining variables are included as controls. All specifications control for log distance, latitude difference, and
origin fixed effects. Standard errors are given in parentheses and are robust. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Alternative Instruments
Panel A: Variations of leave-out categories FDI 2014 (Dummy)
Excluding origins with correlated migration flows: I to,−r(d) × (I t−s1(o),d/I t−s1(o)) 0.181***
(0.027)
Excluding origins with correlated 2010 ancestry stock: I to,−r(d) × (I t−s2(o),d/I t−s2(o)) 0.217***
(0.030)
Excluding states adjacent to the destination: I to,−adj(d) × (I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o)) 0.192***
(0.022)
Panel B: Using subsets of instruments for identification FDI 2014 (Dummy)
Only migrations 1880− 1930 0.209***
(0.037)
Only migrations 1970− 2000 0.175***
(0.021)
Only migrations 1900− 2000 0.187***
(0.024)
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from instrumental variable regressions that are variations
of our standard specification (column 3 of Table 3). Each row lists the coefficient estimate on Log Ancestry
2010. Panel A shows alternative specifications of our leave-out instrument: we exclude from the pull factor
all countries for which the time correlation of total migration to the US with o’s migration to the US is
greater than .5 and significant at the 5% level; we exclude from the pull factor all countries for which the
correlation of 2010 ancestry across the US with o’s ancestry across the US is greater than .5 and significant
at the 5% level; and in the push factor of o we exclude migrations to any state adjacent to the state of
d including the state itself, respectively. In Panel B we use throughout the interacted instrument of our
standard specification but each specification in this panel uses as instruments only the simple interaction
terms from a subset of the full time period covered by our data. Standard errors are given in parenthesis
and clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table 6: The Effect of Ancestry on Immigration Flows and FDI Flows
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A Immigration 1990-2000 Log immigration 1990-2000 Log immigration 1980-1990
Log Ancestry 1990 9.662** 0.556***
(4.455) (0.075)












N 612,495 612,495 612,495
Panel B FDI 2014 (Dummy) Log total # of FDI relationships 2014
Log Ancestry 2010 0.086*** 0.082*** 0.142***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.049)
FDI 2007 (Dummy) 0.542*** 0.544***
(0.031) (0.032)
Log Total # of FDI Relationships 2007 0.685***
(0.020)
N 612,495 612,495 10,851
Notes: Panel A of the table presents the coefficient estimates from IV regressions of equation (8) at the country-county level. The dependent
variable is the immigration flow from 1990 to 2000 in columns 1-2 and the immigration flow from 1980 to 1990 in column 3. In all columns, we
instrument for Log Ancestry with the double-interactions of pull and push factors from prior censuses, {I to,−r(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))}t=1880,...,1980.
All specifications control for log distance, latitude difference, origin×destination-census-region, and destination×continent-of-origin fixed
effects. Standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered at the origin country level. Panel B: Columns 1 and 2 present coefficient
estimates from IV regressions of equation (1) at the country-county level analogous to Table 3 column 3. The dependent variable is a
dummy indicating an FDI relationship between origin o and destination d in 2014. Column 1 of panel B includes all double-interactions as
instruments ,{I to,−r(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))}t=1880,...,2000, while columns 2 and 3 include only double-interactions of the push and pull factors from
the 1990 and 2000 censuses, {I to,−r(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))}t=1990,2000. Panel B column 3 presents the IV/GMM estimate of equation (7). This
specification controls for log distance, latitude difference, origin, and destination fixed effects and does not apply the Heckman Correction.
All specifications in panel B include destination, origin, destination × continent, and origin × census region fixed effects. Standard errors
are given in parentheses and are clustered at the origin country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table 7: The “Similarities” Hypothesis and Contract Enforcement
(1) (2)
Panel A: Final vs. Intermediate Goods FDI 2014 (Dummy)
Log Ancestry 2010 0.156*** 0.169***
(0.026) (0.024)
N 612,495 612,495
Sample Final goods Intermediate goods
Panel B: Final vs. Intermediate Goods Inward FDI 2014 (Dummy)
Log Ancestry 2010 0.108*** 0.117***
(0.033) (0.032)
N 612,495 612,495
Sample Final goods Intermediate goods
Panel C: Sector similarity Rank Correlation Cosine correlation
Log Ancestry 2010 0.011 0.010
(0.015) (0.013)
N 21,518 21,518
Panel D: Judicial Quality FDI 2014 (Dummy) Log # of FDI relationships
Log Ancestry × Judicial Quality 0.180* 1.414***
(0.094) (0.243)
N 452,304 10,089
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from IV regressions at the country-county
level. In Panel A, the outcome variable is the FDI dummy; we restrict our sample to firms
producing final goods or intermediate inputs, respectively. Final goods and intermediate
inputs are defined as 4-digit NAICS sectors with upstreamness index below and above 2,
respectively, where we use the upstreamness index from Antra`s et al. (2012). The number of
country-county pairs that have an (non-zero) FDI link in the corresponding sector is 4,201
and 5,842 in columns 1 and 2, respectively. In Panel B, we replicate the same regressions,
except that the outcome variable indicates only the existence of any inward FDI. In Panel
C, the outcome variable is the rank and cosine correlation of the share of employees in 127
manufacturing sectors within a given origin-destination pair, respectively. The relatively low
number of observations is due to data availability in the industry share of employment: When
calculating the correlation between industries’ share of employment in county d and country
o, the correlation coefficient is missing for those country-county pairs that have at least one
missing share of employment. In Panel D, the outcome is the extensive (FDI dummy) and
intensive (log # of FDI relationships) margin, and the measure of judicial quality is from Nunn
(2007). Throughout we use {I to,−r(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))}t=1880,...,2000 and principal components as
instrumental variables. All specifications control for log distance, latitude difference, and origin
and destination fixed effects. In Panels A-C we additionally control for origin×destination-
census-region, and destination×continent-of-origin fixed effects. Standard errors are given in
parentheses and are clustered by origin country.
48
Table 8: The Effect of Ancestry on Differential Information Demand and Language
Panel A: Google Trends Information Demand Index Actors Athletes Musicians Politicians
(standardized) (standardized) (standardized) (standardized) (standardized)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Ancestry 2010 0.871*** 1.717** 0.659** 0.948*** 0.531*** 0.688***
(0.257) (0.783) (0.257) (0.359) (0.076) (0.183)
Log Foreign-born 2010 -1.108
(0.809)
Log Ancestry 1980 0.801***
(0.186)
N 19,110 19,110 19,110 19,110 19,110 19,110 19,110
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Principal Components Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Language # of residents in d speaking # of US-born in d that speak
language of o at home the language of o at home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ancestry 2010 2.226*** 0.942*** 1.170*** 1.257*** 0.085*** 0.015***
(0.717) (0.301) (0.042) (0.230) (0.006) (0.003)
Ancestry 1980 1.241**
(0.504)
N 454,812 454,813 454,813 65,877 78,376 3,137 3,137
Non-English language Any Any Any Spanish Arabic Chinese Hindi
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from IV regressions at the country-DMA (Panel A) and country-county (Panel B) level. In Panel A, all
dependent variables are based on a count of Google searches in the category specified above the panel. The Information Demand Index in columns 1-3 is
a simple average of the other four categories. Each of the four categories is the average of Google Trends value G(i, d), which measures the (normalized)
fraction of queries that include search term i relative to the total number of queries of Designated Market Area (DMA) d. For the search terms i we
use the first five terms from Google’s Answer Box when we search for “notable [foreign country d] [category]”. All outcome variables in Panel A are
standardized by their standard deviation. In Panel B, the dependent variable in column 1 is the number of residents in d that speak the language of o
at home, excluding English; in column 2 and 3, it is the number of US-born residents in d that speak the language of o at home, excluding English; and
in columns 3-6, it is the number of US-born residents in d that speak the language indicated in the respective column. Spanish is the official language
in twenty-one countries; Arabic is the official language in twenty-five countries; Chinese and Hindi each are the official language in only one country.
Ancestry 2010, Ancestry 1980, Log Ancestry 2010, Log Foreign-born 2010, and Log Ancestry 1980 are instrumented as in column 2 of Table 3. All
specifications control for log distance and latitude difference. Standard errors are given in parentheses and clustered at the country level (all of Panel
A and columns 1-2 of Panel B) or state level (columns 3-6 of Panel B). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
49
Table 9: Network Effects
FDI 2014 (Dummy) Log Total # of FDI relationships
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Spillovers
Log Ancestry 2010 0.237*** 0.166*** 1.027*** 0.179***
(0.020) (0.026) (0.168) (0.052)
Log Ancestry 2010, State Level -0.015*** -0.315***
(0.004) (0.052)
Log Ancestry 2010 of Nearest Origin Country -0.047** 0.037
(0.019) (0.176)
N 612,495 612,495 10,851 10,851
Panel B: Diversity
Log Ancestry 2010 0.197*** 0.123*** 0.661*** 0.641***
(0.061) (0.030) (0.245) (0.089)
Log Ancestry × Foreign Share 1.388 3.548
(3.103) (7.803)
Log Ancestry × Ethnic Diversity 1.270*** 3.692***
(0.204) (1.009)
N 611,910 612,495 10,851 10,851
Panel C: Fractionalization
Log Ancestry 2010 0.269*** 0.334*** 0.914*** 1.247***
(0.037) (0.081) (0.149) (0.109)
Log Ancestry × Geographic Distance 0.101*** 0.170** 0.414*** 0.864***
(0.036) (0.076) (0.128) (0.156)
Log Ancestry × Judicial Quality 0.373** 2.375***
(0.187) (0.494)
Log Ancestry × Fractionalization 0.470 3.087***
(0.324) (0.831)
N 446,022 446,022 10,089 10,089
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from IV regressions at the country-county level. The
dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the dummy for FDI in 2014. The dependent variable in columns
3 and 4 is the log of the number of FDI links in 2014. We use {I to,−r(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))}t=1880,...,2000 and
principal components as instruments. All specifications control for log distance, latitude difference, origin,
and destination fixed effects, as in column 2 of Table 3. In columns 2 and 4 of Panel A, destination ×
continent fixed effects are used to control for the increased substitutability of immigrants from a common
continent. Foreign Share, Ethnic Diversity, Distance, Judicial Quality, and Fractionalization are demeaned.
Standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered at the origin country level. *, **, and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Foreign Share is the share of the
destination county’s population that are of any foreign ancestry in 2010. Diversity of Ancestries is measured
as 1 minus the Herfindhal index of ancestry shares in the destination county. Judicial quality in the origin
is from Nunn (2007); genetic distance is from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015); and Ethnic Fractionalization
refers to 1 minus the Herfindahl index of ethnicities in the origin country calculated using the data in
Alesina et al. (2003).
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To construct the migration and ancestry data up until the year 2000, we download the 1880,
1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1970, 1980, and 2000 waves of the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS) from https://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/samples. For each wave, we select
the largest available sample; for example, if a 1% and 10% sample was available for 1880 data, we
used the 10% sample. To construct the 2010 data, we used the 2006-2010 American Community
Survey (ACS) sample provided on the IPUMS website. For a more detailed overview on the
specific waves used, see Appendix Table 1.
For each sample, we obtain the following variables: year, datanum, serial, hhwt, region, state-
fip, county, cntygp97, cntygp98, puma, gq, pernum, perwt, bpl, mbpl, fbpl, nativity, ancestr1,
yrimmig, mtongue, mmtongue, fmtongue, and language.
We construct the number of migrants from origin country o to destination county d in t, I to,d,
as well as the measure of ancestry Ato,d from 1980 onward. We first aggregate the individual-level
census data to counts of respondents at the level of historic US counties (or country groups from
1970 onwards) and foreign countries, and then transform the data into 1990 country-county level
using various transition matrices. Details are given in the following sections.
How we create transition matrices
We create a set of transition matrices that transform non-1990 countries to 1990 countries and
non-1990 counties/county groups to 1990 counties.
• Birthplace-to-country: The aim is to construct transition matrices that map all the birth-
place answers into 1990 countries. In each wave of the US Census, respondents were
asked to report their country of birth. All possible answers (across time) are listed
here: https://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variables/BPL#codes_section. The cen-
suses from 1850-2012 contain roughly 550 possible different answers to the question of
birthplace. In each census data set, they are saved in the variable “bpld.” What follows is
our procedure for building those matrices:
1. We start with a transition matrix of zeros, with all possible answers to the 1990
birthplace question as rows and all 1990 countries as columns. A cell in row r and
column c of the transition matrix answers the question, “What is the probability that
an individual who claims his/her birthplace as r refers to the area that in 1990 is
country c?” So all cells contain values in [0,1], and rows sum up to 1.
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2. For each row r in the transition matrix, if r with certainty refers to the area that in
1990 is country c, we simply change the entry in cell (r,c) from 0 to 1; if r does refer to
an area that in 1990 is in multiple countries, then we search for the 1990 population of
each possible country, and assign probabilities in proportion to the population data.
We use the population information from the Worldbank database.54.
Panel A in Appendix Table 2 lists the distribution of weights that we end up using, and
the affected countries and persons.
• Ancestry-to-country: The aim is to construct transition matrices that map all the answers
to the ancestry question into 1990 countries. The 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 census
data provide information on the ancestry (ancestr1, 3-digit version). All possible an-
swers (across time) are listed here: https://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variables/
ANCESTR1/#codes_section. The procedure is the same as in the birthplace-to-country
procedure. Panel B in Appendix Table 2 lists the distribution of weights that we end up
using, and the affected countries and persons.
• Group-to-county & PUMA-to-county: The aim is to construct transition matrices that map
all the county groups/PUMAs into individual counties. For the years 1970 and 1980, the US
census data are at the US county group level. A “county group” is an agglomeration of US
counties. For the years 2000 and 2010, the census data are at the PUMA level. A “PUMA”
is also an agglomeration of US counties.55 To construct transition matrices from county
agglomeration level to county level, we download the corresponding matching files from
the IPUMS website. We use data on the population of each county (within each county
group/PUMA) to assign a probability that an observation from county group/PUMA g
in year t is from county c in year t. This approach gives a transition matrix from year t
county groups to year t counties. Appendix Table 3 lists the distribution of weights that
we end up using, and the affected counties and persons.
• County-to-county: The aim is to construct transition matrices that map all the non-1990
counties into 1990 counties. This step is necessary because the list and boundaries of US
counties changed over time. Similarly to the birthplace-to-country and ancestry-to-country
procedure, we use one transition matrix per census year (1880, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1970,
1980, 2000, 2010). Such a transition matrix has as rows all US counties, indexed c, in year
t, and as columns all 1990 US counties, indexed m. Each cell of the transition matrix takes
a value that answers the question, “Which fraction of the area of the county c in year t is
in 1990 part of county m?” Appendix Table 3 lists the distribution of weights that we end
up using, and the affected counties and persons. More specifically, we build these matrices
as follows:
1. We download the year-specific map files. For 1880 us counties, we obtain the 503MB
GIS file from Atlas: http://publications.newberry.org/ahcbp/downloads/united_
states.html and extract the 1880 part. For 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930 counties, we
obtain the maps from IPUMS: https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/ICPSR.shtml.
54http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
55Detailed description of “county group” and “PUMA” can be found here: https://usa.ipums.org/usa/
volii/tgeotools.shtml.
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Finally, for 1970, 1980, and 1990 counties, we obtain the maps from NHGIS: https:
//data2.nhgis.org/main.
2. We project non-1990 maps onto 1990 counties. We used the intersect command in
ArcGIS to map year-specific counties onto 1990 counties based on area. This approach
gives a transition matrix from non-1990 counties to 1990 counties.
Appendix Table 1: Description of each IPUMS wave
Wave Description
1880 We use the 10% sample with oversamples; the sample is weighted, so we use the
provided person weights to get to a representative sample; we use the region identifiers
statefip and county.
1900 We use the 5% sample; the sample is weighted, so we use the provided person weights
to get to a representative sample; we use the region identifiers statefip and county.
1910 We use the 1% sample; the sample is unweighted; we use the region identifiers statefip
and county.
1920 We use the 1% sample; the sample is weighted, so we use the provided person weights
to get to a representative sample; we use the region identifiers statefip and county.
1930 We use the 5% sample; the sample is weighted, so we use the provided person weights
to get to a representative sample; we use the region identifiers statefip and county.
1970 We use the 1% Form 1 Metro sample; the sample is unweighted; we use the region
identifiers statefip and cntygp97 (county group 1970); note that only four states can
be completely identified because metropolitan areas that straddle state boundaries are
not assigned to states; identifies every metropolitan area of 250,000 or more.
1980 We use the 5% State sample; the sample is unweighted; we use the region identifiers
statefip and cntygp98 (county group 1980); the sample identifies all states, larger
metropolitan areas, and most counties over 100,000 population.
1990 We use the 5% State sample; the sample is weighted, so we use the provided person
weights to get to a representative sample; we use the region identifiers statefip and
puma; the sample identifies all states, and within states, most counties or parts of
counties with 100,000 or more population.
2000 We use the 5% Census sample; the sample is weighted, so we use the provided person
weights to get to a representative sample; we use region identifiers statefip and puma;
the sample identifies all states, and within states, most counties or parts of counties
with 100,000 or more population.
2010 We use the American Community Service (ACS) 5-Year sample; the sample is weighted,
so we use the provided person weights to get to a representative sample; we use region
identifiers statefip and puma, which contain at least 100,000 persons; the 2006-2010
data contains all households and persons from the 1% ACS samples for 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009 and 2010, identifiable by year.
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Appendix Table 2: Historical birthplace to current country: transition matrices
Panel A: Birthplace weights ∈ (0, 1) weight = 1 weights = 0
1880 # of answers 22 258 9
# of persons 26,301 50,177,184 4,933
% of persons 0.05% 99.94% .01%
1900 # of answers 15 131 6
# of persons 23,345 6,555,140 5,339
% of persons 0.35% 99.56% .08%
1910 # of answers 20 99 4
# of persons 31,072 5,613,136 3,105
% of persons 0.55% 99.39% .05%
1920 # of answers 13 174 7
# of persons 36,070 3,905,455 12,559
% of persons 0.91% 98.77% .32%
1930 # of answers 25 194 9
# of persons 35,930 3,086,341 61,462
% of persons 1.13% 96.94% 1.93%
1970 # of answers 12 77 3
# of persons 318,800 6,323,100 230,800
% of persons 4.64% 92.00% 3.36%
1980 # of answers 32 222 7
# of persons 491,760 4,774,820 313,300
% of persons 8.81% 85.57% 5.61%
1990 # of answers 24 209 7
# of persons 721,595 8,532,585 484,433
% of persons 7.41% 87.62% 4.97%
2000 # of answers 11 136 0
# of persons 1,122,532 13,144,632 0
% of persons 7.87% 92.13% 0%
2010 # of answers 14 137 1
# of persons 1,302,255 11,131,046 17,148
% of persons 10.46% 89.40% .14%
2010* # of answers 14 188 1
# of persons 3,512,123 300,415,680 37,469
% of persons 1.16% 98.83% .01%
Panel B: Ancestry weights ∈ (0, 1) weight = 1 weights = 0
1980 # of answers 29 227 143
# of persons 924,400 198,525,616 27,412,380
% of persons 0.41% 87.51% 12.08%
1990 # of answers 29 239 9
# of persons 2,941,941 217,720,512 27,445,182
% of persons 1.19% 87.75% 11.06%
2000 # of answers 17 137 22
# of persons 6,000,639 191,300,704 84,120,558
% of persons 2.13% 67.98% 29.9%
2010 # of answers 19 142 30
# of persons 8,454,279 229,211,968 66,299,030
% of persons 2.78% 75.41% 21.81%
The table reports statistics on the transition of data from the ‘answer’ level to 1990
country level. For each survey wave, and each question – birthplace in Panel A and
primary ancestry in Panel B – the table reports the number of answers that can be
directly linked to a 1990 country (weight = 1), that are assigned to several 1990
countries using population weights (weights ∈ (0, 1)) and that cannot be linked to
any modern country with sufficient certainty (weights = 0). The table also reports
the number of respondents (scaled from the original data using the person weights
provided) in each category. Answers with weights zero essentially consists of ”Not
Reported” (e.g. 23, 24, 54 and 30 million respondents for the 1980, 1990, 2000 and
2010 ancestry data, respectively) and ”African-American” (e.g. 26, 22 and 25 million
respondents for the 1990, 2000 and 2010 ancestry data, respectively). The remainders
are mostly cases such as ”African”, ”Uncodable”, ”Bohemian”, ”Nuevo Mexicano”,
”Other”, etc. In Panel A, all years except 1880 consist of the number of persons that
report birthplace since the last Census wave. For the 2010 Census wave the additional
entry (denoted by a *) reports the respective numbers for all respondents in that wave.
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Appendix Table 3: Historical state-county unit to 1990 state-county unit: transition matrices
Census wave weights ∈ (0, 1) weight = 1 weights = 0
1880 # of counties 658 1854 1
% of persons (birthplace data) 21.54% 78.45% .01%
1900 # of counties 2211 7 4
% of persons (birthplace data) 99.09% 0.87% .05%
1910 # of counties 1517 5 1
% of persons (birthplace data) 99.00% 0.94% .05%
1920 # of counties 1355 7 0
% of persons (birthplace data) 90.80% 9.20% 0%
1930 # of counties 1801 6 0
% of persons (birthplace data) 90.61% 9.39% 0%
1970 # of countygroups 310 98 0
% of persons (birthplace data) 34.07% 65.93% 0%
1980 # of countygroups 580 573 0
% of persons (birthplace data) 17.96% 82.04% 0%
% of persons (ancestry data) 40.02% 59.98% 0%
1990 # of PUMAs 541 1185 0
% of persons (birthplace data) 8.97% 91.03% 0%
% of persons (ancestry data) 32.15% 67.85% 0%
2000 # of PUMAs 620 1451 0
% of persons (birthplace data) 10.66% 89.34% 0%
% of persons (ancestry data) 30.36% 69.64% 0%
2010 # of PUMAs 619 1449 1
% of persons (birthplace data) 12.31% 87.65% .03%
% of persons (ancestry data) 30.13% 69.81% .05%
The table reports statistics on the transition of data from the ‘historical spatial
area’ level to 1990 US county level. For each Census wave the table reports the
number of contemporaneous spatial areas that are a subset of a 1990 US county
(weight = 1) and the number of contemporaneous spatial areas whose data
is transitioned to 1990 US county level using non-degenerate weights (weights
∈ (0, 1)). For Census waves 1880 to 1930 the share of their contemporaneous
county spatial area in each 1990 US county area is used as weight. For waves
1970 to 2010 there are two steps: In step 1 the share of their contemporaneous
countygroup (waves 1970 and 1980) or PUMA (waves 1990 to 2010) population
in the contemporaneous county population are used as weights; in step 2 the
share of their contemporaneous county spatial area in each 1990 US county area
is used as weight. The two-step procedure is necessary because the 1970 to 2010
Census waves do not have a county-level identifier (to protect the privacy of the
respondents). The table also reports the share of respondents affected by this
transition in the birthplace and ancestry data, respectively.
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A.1 Details on the construction of migration and ethnicity data
Details calculation of post-1880 flow of immigrants
For each census wave after 1880, we count the number of individuals in each historic US county
d who were born in historic country o (as identified by birthplace variable “bpld” in the raw
data) that had immigrated to the United States since the last census wave that contains the
immigration variable (not always 10 years earlier). Then we transform these data
• from the non-1990 foreign-country (“bpld”) level to the 1990 foreign-country level using
bpld-to-country transition matrices.
• from the US-county group/puma level to the US-county level using group/puma-to-county
transition matrices.
• from the non-1990 US-county level to the 1990 US-county level using county-to-county
transition matrices.
• from the post-1990 US-county level to the 1990 US county level. Based on the information
from https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/county-changes.html, a new county is
either created from part of ONE 1990 county or assigned a new FIPS code after 1990,
so we manually change that county’s FIPS code to what it was in 1990. A few counties’
boundaries have been changed after 1990 but that only involved a tiny change in population,
so we ignore these differences.
Details calculation of pre-1880 stock of immigrants
For the year 1880, we calculate for each historic US county d the number of individuals who
were born in a historic foreign country o (no matter when they immigrated). We add to those
calculations the number of individuals in county d who were born in the United States, but whose
parents were born in historic foreign country o. (If the parents were born in different countries,
we count the person as half a person from the mother’s place of birth, and half a person from
the father’s place of birth). Then we transform these data
• from the pre-1880 foreign-country (“bpld”) level to the 1990 foreign-country level using the
pre-1880 country-to-country transition matrix.
• from the pre-1880 US-county level to the 1990 US-county level using the pre-1880 county-
to-county transition matrix.
Details calculation of stock of ancestry (1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010)
For the years 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010, we calculate for each US county group the number
of individuals who state as primary ancestry (“ancestr1” variable) some nationality/area. We
transform the data
• from the ancestry-answer (“ancestr1”) level to the 1990 foreign-country level using ancestry-
to-country transition matrices.
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• from the US-county group/puma level to the US county-level using group/puma-to-county
transition matrices.
• from the non-1990 US-county level to the 1990 US-county level using county-to-county
transition matrices.
• from the post-1990 US-county to the 1990 US-county level. Based on the information
from https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/county-changes.html, a new county is
either created from part of ONE 1990 county or assigned a new FIPS code after 1990,
so we manually change that county’s FIPS code to what it was in 1990. A few counties’
boundaries have been changed after 1990 but that only involved a tiny change in population,
so we ignore the difference.
A.2 Details on the construction of FDI data
Our FDI data are from the US file of the Bureau van Dijk ORBIS dataset. For each US firm,
the raw data set lists the location of its (operational) headquarters, the addresses of its foreign
parent entities, and the addresses of its international subsidiaries and branches. It also provides
the number of employees for both US and foreign firms. The steps for building the data follow
below.
Clean postcode information
We use firm’s postcode as a unique identifier for the county location of the US firm, and then
need to ensure that one county uniquely corresponds to one postcode. Vance, NC; Wakulla,
FL; Citrus, FL; Rankin, MS; Union, OH; and Du Page, IL share at least one postcode with a
neighboring county. In each case we assign that postcode wholly to the county with the larger
population (according to Google 2012 population data). In the last step, we hand-coded missing
postcodes that we took from main data set. Only one such case existed: 75427 for Dallas.
Build the parent data
We used the following variables from the parent dataset: “Mark” “Company name” “BvD ID
number” “Country ISO Code” “City” “Postcode” “NAICS 2007 Core code (4 digits)” “NAICS,
text description” “Number of employees 2013” “Shareholder - Name” “Shareholder - BvD ID
number” “Shareholder - City” “Shareholder - Postal code” “Shareholder - NAICS 2007, Core
code” “Shareholder - NAICS 2007, text description” “Shareholder - Country ISO code” “Share-
holder - Direct %” “Shareholder - Total %” “Shareholder - Number of employees”. Here “share-
holder” is equivalent to “parent” in our context. The key data-building steps are as follows:
1. Assign numerical values to “Shareholder Direct” and “Shareholder Total”:
• When the stake of a shareholder is described by an acronym rather than a number,
we replace it with numerical values as follows: MO, majority owned, is replaced by
“75%”; JO, jointly owned, is replaced by “50%”; NG, negligent, is replaced by ‘0%’;
BR, branch and WO, wholly owned are both replaced by “100%”.56
56See http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407845 for reference.
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• When the stake of a shareholder is described by the following expressions, we replace
it with a numerical value as follows: Values with a “>”, e.g., “ > 25.00” were replaced
by the original number plus 10; values with a “<”, e.g., “ < 34.00”, were replaced by
the original number minus 10; values with a “±”, e.g. “±25.00”, were replaced by the
original number.
2. Postcode matching: We matched both US firms and US parents (foreign parents were ig-
nored in this step), with our postcode data. Besides the original string variable postcode, we
generated new variables postcode5digit and postcodeextension and labeled them “Postal
code (5 digit)” and “Postal code (extension).” Similarly, shareholders had shareholder-
postcodeUS5digit and shareholderpostcodeUSextension (note the spelling postal code in
shareholder variables was unified to postcode).
3. Country-code matching: We matched both companies and their parents. Each firm had
four country variables: numerical country code, country name, and 2- and 3- digit ISO
country code. Then we adjusted those 2014 country codes to 1990 codes based on the
information on post-1990 country changes.
Build the subsidiary data
We used the following variables from the subsidiary dataset: “Mark” “Company name” “BvD ID
number” “Country ISO Code” “City” “Postcode” “NAICS 2007 Core code (4 digits)” “NAICS,
text description” “Number of employees 2007” “Subsidiary - Name” “Subsidiary - BvD ID num-
ber” “Subsidiary - Country ISO code” “Subsidiary - City” “Subsidiary - Postal code” “Subsidiary
- NAICS 2007, Core code” “Subsidiary - NAICS 2007, text description” “Subsidiary - Number of
employees” “Subsidiary - Direct %” ”Subsidiary - Total%” “Branch - Name” ”Branch - BvD ID
number” “Branch - Country ISO code” “Branch - City” “Branch - Postcode” “Branch - NAICS
2007, Core code” “Branch - NAICS 2007, text description” “Branch - Number employees”. The
data cleaning process is identical to that of the parent data described above, with the exception
that we merged subsidiaries with branches and refer to them collectively as “subsidiaries”.
A.3 Details on the construction of other data
International trade.— The data on trade between US states and foreign countries, both at the
aggregate level and at the sectoral level, are from the Commodity Flow Survey for the year 2012.
The data are collected by the US Census Bureau. A representative sample of establishments
are surveyed every five years, and information on their shipments collected. The value of all
shipments crossing the US international border are recorded as international trade, along with
their foreign origin/destination country. We only used thes readily available data aggregated at
the US state and foreign country level. Although they do not cover all of the US foreign trade (the
data com from a representative survey, not from the universe of foreign transactions), they are
the only publicly available source of international data disaggregated at a geographic level below
that of the entire United States. For each origin country and destination state, Importo,d are
aggregate imports (in dollars) from country o to US state d in 2012, and Exporto,d are aggregate
exports (in dollars) from US state d to country o in 2012, where we keep the convention of using
o for foreign countries and d for US administrative units, states or counties.
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Bilateral distances and latitude differences.— To compute the distance between US counties
or states and foreign countries, we used the coordinates for all postal codes within a county or
state, and the coordinates of the main city for foreign countries.57 We define the latitude and
longitude of a US county as the unweighted average of the latitudes and longitudes of all postal
codes within the county. We define the latitude and longitude of a US state as the unweighted
average of the latitude and longitude of all counties within the state. The distance between
foreign country o and a US county or state d, Distanceo,d, is computed as the great circle
distance between the two, measured in kms. The latitude difference between a foreign country
o and a US county or state d, LatitudeDifferenceo,d, is the absolute difference between the
latitudes of the two, measured in degrees.
Country characteristics.— To shed light on the mechanism through which the presence of
foreign ancestry affects the patterns for foreign investment, we constructed several measures of
foreign country and US county characteristics. “Genetic Distance” is a measure of the genetic
distance between a given foreign country and the United States, normalized to take values be-
tween 0 and 1. “Linguistic Distance” is a measure of the linguistic distance between a given
foreign country and the United States; it measures the probability that a randomly selected
person in the United States speaks the same language as a randomly selected person from that
country. “Religious Distance” measures the religious distance between a given foreign country
and the United States, with a similar construction as the linguistic distance.58 A higher index
for “Genetic Distance”, “Linguistic Distance”, or “Religious Distance” corresponds to a greater
distance between the United States and that country. “Judicial Quality” is a measure of the
judicial quality in a given country.59 A higher index for “Judicial Quality” corresponds to a
higher-quality judicial system. “Ethnic Diversity” is a measure of a country’s ethnolinguistic
fractionalization.60
US county characteristics.— We define three US-county level measures. “Diversity of An-
cestries” is a measure of the diversity of communities from different ancestries in a given US
county.61 “Foreign Share” measures the share of residents in a given county who claim foreign
ancestry.
Sectoral characteristics.— We separated sectors into final consumption goods and interme-
diate inputs. To do so, we use the measure of upstreamness from Antra`s et al. (2012). We
classified 4-digit NAICS sectors as “final goods” if their upstreamness index is below 2, and as
“intermediates” if their upstreamness index is above 2.
57The geo-coordinates are downloaded from www.geonames.organd www.cepii.fr, respectively. When a
county has multiple postcodes we randomly select one of them and use the geocoordinates for that randomly
selected postcode.
58Both genetic and religious distance measures come from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015).
59The measure of judicial quality comes from Kaufmann et al. (2003) and is used in Nunn (2007). It is based
on a weighted average of variables measuring perceptions of the effectiveness of the judiciary and the enforcement
of contracts.
60The measure of fractionalization comes from Alesina et al. (2003). It is equal to 1 minus the Herfindahl index
of ethnolinguistic group shares.
61It is equal to 1 minus the Herfindahl index of ancestry, measured as the sum of squared fractions of all possible
ancestry among people who report foreign ancestry within that US county
59
A.4 Details on the construction of information demand indices
The Information Demand Index is based on data gathered from Google and created in three
steps. In the first step we identify five prominent individuals from country o in category p, where
p ∈ {actors, athletes, musicians, politicians}. In the second step we utilise Google Trends to
obtain data on the spatial variation in the relative frequency of search queries related to these
individuals. In the last step we construct indices of the search intensity related to country o in
destination d.
Step 1: To identify the top five prominent individuals from o in each category p, we utilise a
tool called Google’s featured snippet box. Google’s featured snippet box is a response to a search
query that is generated by Google and pushed to the top of the result list. Google generates
these answers by scraping its top results and using an algorithm to provide what it determines
to be the most relevant answer.62 For our purposes we record the top five names in Google’s
featured snippet box in response to the query “notable [country] [p]”, where [country] is one
of the 100 largest countries by 2015 population. For example, searching for “notable Belgium
actors” yields Google’s featured snippet box with an ordered list of Belgian actors. We save the
top five names from left to right as the set of search queries q(o, p). If Google’s featured snippet
box does not give a response for a country, we record a missing entry.63
Step 2: Google Trends provides historical and cross-sectional information about the relative
importance of a search query. For the United States, the cross-sectional information with the
highest granularity is at the level of a Designated Market Area (DMA).64 Google Trends expresses
the relative importance of a search query in a given DMA as an integer value from 0 to 100.
This integer value is calculated as follows. First, find the number of searches for the query at
hand relative to the total number of searches, and define the maximum search market share of
any DMA to 100. Second, divide each search market share by the maximum, and express it as a
rounded percentage. If the result does not exceed an unreported threshold, set it to zero (Liang,





maxδ{sharei,δ}1[#(i, d) ≥ T ]
⌉
where bxe is the integer round function, sharei,d is the search market share of search query i in
DMA d, and T is the unreported search volume threshold. Note that T is defined on the absolute
number of searches, rather than the search market share. This implies that DMAs with a larger
population will tend to report more data than those with smaller populations. Note also that
in addition to G(i, d) being reported as zero for some i and d, we set its value equal to zero if
there is no search result from Google’s featured snippet box, or if there is no result from Google
Trend.
62See https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/6229325?hl=en
63This is the case for about 4-10% of our sample, depending on the category.
64Google Trends also breaks the information down by major city; however, we would lose non-city data.
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Step 3: We define the p-specific Index for each DMA-country pair as













to the query “notable [country] [p]”, where [country] is one of the 100 largest countries in 2015.
A.5 Details on the construction of crop suitability measures
The crop suitability index for each origin country o and destination county d is taken from the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Global Agro-Ecological Zones (FAO-
GAEZ) data. We estimate potential agricultural similarity between each origin country o and
county d by constructing a distance measure based on the difference in crop suitability of the
country and county for a select group of crops. The following outlines the steps taken in order
to create a crop suitability distance measure for each country-county pair.
Step 1: To identify the crops to be used in constructing the crop suitability distance measure,
we compare data from FAOSTAT on the top crops produced by the U.S. in 2014 with data
available from FAO-GAEZ on crop suitability. We then select the top 10 crops, based on value
of agricultural production, for which there is data in FAO-GAEZ were used: rice, maize, wheat,
soybeans, tomatoes, white potatoes, sugar cane, cotton, yams, and cassava. For each crop, we
extract the crop suitability data by selecting the total production capacity data (located within
the attainable yield/agro-ecological suitability data) and setting the water-supply to rainfed,
input level to high, and time period to baseline (1961-1990).
Step 2: To take the global crop suitability data for each crop and define crop suitability for
each county and country, we utilise ArcMap software. For counties, the U.S. 1990 counties border
map is used. For countries, we extract data on 1990 country borders from a dataset including all
country borders for the period post-WWII to 2015.65 Then, for each crop, we utilise the ArcMap
software to calculate the average of crop suitability for each county and country.66
Step 3: We rescale the crop suitability data to a 0 to 1 scale and then calculate the crop

















65The original shapefile is version 0.6 (updated November 30, 2016) from Weidmann, Nils B., Doreen Kuse, and
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. ”The Geography of the International System: The CShapes Dataset.” International
Interactions 36, no. 1 (2010).
66Data is missing for 23 counties and 35 countries due to issues with overlapping polygons as well as missing
1990 boundaries data for certain countries.
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where sn is the measure of crop suitability for crop n.
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Appendix Figure 1: First-Stage Coefficients
Notes: Coefficient estimates (bars) and 95% confidence intervals (lines) on the excluded instruments
{Ito,−r(d)(It−c(o),d/It−c(o))}t=1880,...,2000 from Table 2, column 2. The dependent variable is Log Ancestry
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Appendix Figure 2: Reduced-Form Coefficients
Notes: Coefficient estimates (bars) and 95% confidence intervals (lines) on the excluded instruments
{Ito,−r(d)(It−c(o),d/It−c(o))}t=1880,...,2000 from a reduced form regression corresponding to the specification
in column 2 of Table 2, using the 2014 FDI dummy as dependent variable. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the origin country level. The R2 of this regression is 0.218.
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Appendix Figure 3: Ancestry and Total # of FDI relationships (Raw Data)
Notes: The figure presents scatter plots of the raw data for Ancestry 2010 and Total # of FDI relationships 2014
for the 10 largest US counties in terms of # of FDI relationships (counties’ share of total US FDI relationships
indicated in title). For each county, data is shown separately by origins with ancestry share in the bottom 90% of
ancestries in d, and in the top 10% of ancestries in d. Linear regressions are fitted separately for each subfigure;






















































































































































Appendix Figure 4: First Stage Fit
Notes: The figure shows conditional scatter plots of Log Ancestry 2010 versus each of the interacted instruments
It−c(o),d × Ito,−r(d). Each subfigure is constructed as follows: both Log Ancestry 2010 and It−c(o),d × Ito,−r(d)
are regressed on destination × continent-of-orign fixed effects, origin × destination-census-region fixed effects,
distance, and latitude difference, as well as the interacted instruments for all time periods except t; for visual
clarity, residuals of both regressions are binned, separately for each origin o, by quintiles of the residuals of the
former regression; the binned data is scattered, colour-coded by the continent of o. Note that each graph shows
the partial correlation that identifies the nine coefficients of interest in our standard specification of the first stage
in column 4 of Table 2. The first stage – corresponding to a linear least squares fit of the data before binning –




























































Panel B: Correlations of Ancestry in the Cross−Section in 2010
Correlation and P−Value Cutoffs
corr<0 or p>.05 .25>corr >= 0 and p<.05 .5>corr >= 0.25 and p<.05 .75>corr >= 0.5 and p<.05 corr >= 0.75 and p<.05
Appendix Figure 5: Correlation Between Countries of Immigration Waves to the US and 2010 Ancestry Across the US
Notes: These correlation plots display the magnitude of the time-series correlation of total migration to the US between each pair of countries
(Panel A) and the magnitude of the correlation of ancestry in 2010 across the US counties between each pair of origin countries (Panel B). A pair
of origin countries for which the correlation is negative or not significant at the 5% level is displayed with a white dot. For country pairs with
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Appendix Figure 6: Concavity of Effect
Notes: This figure plots of the mean of FDI Dummy 2014 within bins of Ancestry 2010. The
Ancestry 2010 bins are constructed as centiles of the conditional distribution of Ancestry 2010 |Ancestry
2010> 0. The lowest bin corresponds to Ancestry 2010= 0. We do not plot the mean of FDI Dummy
2014 in the 99th and 100th centile Ancestry 2010 bin for visual clarity; the overall concave pattern
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Appendix Figure 7: Heterogeneous Effects across Sectors
Notes: This figure shows funnel plots of the estimated coefficients and standard errors from separate
IV regressions of the FDI dummy on Log 2010 Ancestry for each sector. In all regressions, we use
{Ito,−r(d)(It−c(o),d/It−c(o))}t=1880..2000 and principal components as excluded instruments, and control for
log distance as well as latitude difference. We plot the estimated coefficients (x axis) against the
reciprocal of estimated standard errors on ancestry. The size of the circle is proportional to the size
of the sector. The imposed curve is y = 1.96/x for positive x region and y = −1.96/x for negative x
region. Circles above the curve indicate statistically significant coefficients. See section 3.5 for details.
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Appendix Table 4: Summary Statistics on the Intensive Margin of FDI
Origin-destination pairs (1) (2) (3)
Ancestry 2010 (in thousands) 10.038 16.502 10.861
(40.989) (62.950) (43.593)
# of FDI Relationships 11.043
(39.738)
# of Parents in Destination 2.282
(4.336)
# of Parents in Origin 8.063
(26.132)
# of Workers Employed at Subsidiary in Destination (in thousands) 6.328
(32.695)
# of Subsidiaries in Origin 1.797
(10.671)
# of Parents in Destination 0.761
(3.105)
# of Workers Employed at Subsidiary in Origin (in thousands) 2.435
(40.360)
N 10851 4065 9082
Notes: The table presents means (and standard deviations). Variables refer to our sample of country-
county pairs used in Appendix Table 19. Column 1 shows data for observations that have at least one
FDI link. Column 2 shows data for observations that have at least one subsidiary in the origin. Column
3 shows data for observations pairs that have at least one subsidiary in the destination.
Appendix Table 5: Assignment of States to Census Regions
Census Region State Names
New England Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont
Middle Atlantic New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania
East North Central Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin
West North Central Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota
South Atlantic Delaware, District Of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia
East South Central Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee
West South Central Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas
Mountain Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming
Pacific Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington
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Appendix Table 6: Alternative Instruments based on Immigration and Ancestry Correlation
FDI 2014 (Dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Time-Series Correlation of Total Migration to the US
Log Ancestry 2010 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.181***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Log Distance 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
N 612495 612495 612495 612495
Panel B: Cross-Section Correlation of 2010 Ancestry Across the US
Log Ancestry 2010 0.217*** 0.186*** 0.217*** 0.217***
(0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
Log Distance 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.031
(0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
N 612495 612495 612495 612495
Correlation Cutoff .5 .75 .5 .5
Significance Cutoff NA NA .1 .05
Notes: The table displays estimates of the specification from column 3 of Panel A in Table 3 removing
or not alternative sets of migrations from the construction of pull factors. In Panel A, we exclude from
the pull factor all countries for which the time-series correlation of total migration to the US with o’s
migration to the US is greater than .5, greater than .75, greater than .5 and significant at the 10%
level, and greater than .5 and significant at the 5% level, respectively. In Panel B, we exclude from the
pull factor all countries for which the correlation of 2010 ancestry across destination counties with o’s
ancestry across destination counties is greater than .5, greater than .75, greater than .5 and significant
at the 10% level, and greater than .5 and significant at the 5% level, respectively.
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Appendix Table 7: The Effect of Ancestry on FDI: Variations of Leave-Out Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FDI Dummy (2014)
Panel A: baseline specification {I to,−r(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))} excluded
Log Ancestry 2010 0.231*** 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.189*** 0.198*** 0.191***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.023) (0.024)
N 612495 612495 612495 612495 459150 612495 612300
Panel B: no leave-out {I to(I td/I t)} excluded
Log Ancestry 2010 0.204*** 0.202*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.183*** 0.215***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.017)
N 612495 612495 612495 612495 459150 612495 612300
Panel C: single country/county leave-out {I to,−d(I t−o,d/I t−o)} excluded
Log Ancestry 2010 0.212*** 0.204*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.173*** 0.185*** 0.216***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) (0.017)
N 612495 612495 612495 612495 459150 612495 612300
Panel D: county/continent leave-out {I to,−d(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))} excluded
Log Ancestry 2010 0.223*** 0.217*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.186*** 0.200*** 0.227***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) (0.018)
N 612495 612495 612495 612495 459150 612495 612300
Panel E: adjacent state leave-out {I to,−adj(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))} excluded
Log Ancestry 2010 0.232*** 0.204*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.181*** 0.206*** 0.237***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021) (0.019)
N 640764 640764 640764 640764 459150 640764 640560
Panel F: correlated migrations leave-out {I to,−r(d)(I t−s1(o),d)(I t−s1(o))} excluded
Log Ancestry 2010 0.229*** 0.188*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.173*** 0.182*** 0.182***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.026) (0.027)
N 612495 612495 612495 612495 459150 612495 612300
Panel G: correlated ancestry leave-out {I to,−r(d)(I t−s2(o),d)(I t−s2(o))} excluded
Log Ancestry 2010 0.268*** 0.200*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.222*** 0.221*** 0.220***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) (0.024) (0.029)
N 612495 612495 612495 612495 459150 612495 612300
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Principal Components No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination × Continent FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin × Census Region FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3rd order poly in dist and lat No No No Yes Yes No No





−c(o)) No No No No No Yes No
Origin × State FE No No No No No No Yes
Notes: The table repeats the estimates from Panel A in Table 3 in Panel A and then shows variations
in the following panels, removing or not different sets of migrants from the interaction of pull and push
factors. The construction of the interaction is indicated above each panel. In Panel D, adj (d) refers to
the adjacent states for the state of county d; thus we exclude from the push factor of o migrations to
any state adjacent to the state of d, including the state itself. In Panel E and Panel F, “s” refers to
similar countries; that is, in Panel E we exclude from a given pull factor of o to d all countries for which
the time correlation of total migration to the US with o’s migration to the US is greater than .5 and
significant at the 5% level while for Panel F we exclude from a given pull factor of o to d all countries
for which the correlation of 2010 ancestry across the US with o’s ancestry across the US is greater than
.5 and significant at the 5% level.
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Appendix Table 8: The effect of Ancestry in 2000 on FDI in 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: IV FDI 2007 (Dummy)
Log Ancestry 2000 0.250*** 0.184*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.188*** 0.184***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021)
KP F-stat on excluded IV’s 12.06 10.32 167.32 165.46 156.29 189.21
Stock-Yogo 5% critical values 20.25 20.25 21.10 21.10 21.18 21.10
Stock-Yogo 10% critical values 11.39 11.39 11.52 11.52 11.52 11.52
N 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,300
Panel B: OLS FDI 2007 (Dummy)
Log Ancestry 2000 0.216*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.200***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
N 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,300
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination × Continent FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin × Census Region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Principal Components No No Yes Yes Yes Yes





−c(o)) No No No No Yes No
Origin × State FE No No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from IV (Panel A) and OLS (Panel B) regressions of
equation (1) at the country-county level. The dependent variable in all panels is a dummy indicating
an FDI relationship between origin o and destination d in 2007. The main variable of interest is Log
Ancestry 2000, instrumented using various specifications of equation (4). In all columns in Panel A,
we include {Ito,−r(d)(It−c(o),d/It−c(o))}t=1880,...,1990 as excluded instruments. Columns 3-6 also include the
first five principal components of the higher-order interactions of push and pull factors as instruments.
Column 5 also includes the interaction of the push and pull factor constructed using data from the
1990-2000 wave. All specifications control for log distance, latitude difference, origin, and destination
fixed effects. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the origin
country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from a nonlinear least squares regression at the country-
county level. The dependent variable is the dummy for FDI in 2014. It shows (un-adjusted) NLS
standard errors. We obtain the optimal β and pi by solving the nonlinear least squares problem in
equation (6), excluding the fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Appendix Table 10: Alternative Functional Forms
FDI 2014 (Dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ancestry 2010 0.002***
(0.001)




Log Ancestry 1980 0.218***
(0.034)
Log Ancestry 1990 0.203***
(0.028)
Log Ancestry 2000 0.193***
(0.024)
N 612495 612495 612495 612495 612495 612495
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from IV regressions at the country-county level. The
dependent variable is the dummy for FDI in 2014. The main variable of interest in each column
is the measure of ancestry indicated by the first column of the table. In the second row, we use
Log(Ancestry/1000) instead of Log(1+Ancestry/1000), and replace Log(0) with -1. All specifications
are the same as that in column 3 of Table 3, except that principal components are excluded. Standard
errors are given in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 11: Varying ownership cutoffs
Panel A: FDI dummy on ancestry (IV) FDI 2014 (Dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Ancestry 2010 0.189*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.157***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029)
R2 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.318
N 612495 612495 612495 612495
Panel B: # of FDI relationships on ancestry (IV) Log Total # of FDI relationships
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Ancestry 2010 0.408*** 0.394*** 0.402*** 0.075
(0.042) (0.045) (0.046) (0.062)
R2 0.750 0.749 0.749 0.770
N 10445 10393 10365 6981
Ownership cutoff keep ≥ 5% keep ≥ 25% keep ≥ 50% keep < 50%
Destination × Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin × Census Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Principal Components Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from variations of the IV regression in column 3 of Table 3
(Panel A) and in column 2 of Appendix Table 19 (Panel A). We vary the ownership cutoff across columns:
In columns 1, 2, and 3 we keep all shareholder-subsidiary pairs with ownership ≥ 5%, ≥ 25%, ≥ 50%,
respectively. The number of origin-destination pairs with any FDI under these cutoffs are 10445, 10393,
and 10365. In column 4 we keep all shareholder-subsidiary pairs with ownership < 50%, which results in
6981 origin-destination pairs with any FDI. Standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered at the
origin country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 12: Alternative Standard Errors: Main Specification
Panel A: Analytical
Robust 0.0092
Cluster by county 0.0171
Cluster by country† 0.0243
Cluster by county and country 0.0280
Cluster by state and country 0.0285
Cluster by state 0.0189
Cluster by continent 0.0070
Cluster by state*country 0.0114
Panel B: Bootstrap
Robust 0.0090
Cluster by county 0.0152
Cluster by country 0.0284
Notes: This table shows various standard
errors on Log Ancestry 2010 based on our
standard specification (column 3 of Table
3). The bootstrapped standard errors in
Panel B are obtained using 1,000 draws
with replacement. † denotes our standard
specification.
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Appendix Table 13: Alternative Standard Errors: Other Specifications
Standard Communist natural Intensive Immigration
specification experiment margin 1990-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome variable FDI Dummy (2014) Log total # of Immigration
FDI Relationships 1990-2000
Panel A: Clustered by Country (Standard)
Log Ancestry 2010 0.187*** 0.209*** 0.356***
(0.024) (0.032) (0.056)







Panel B: S.E. Clustered by County
Log Ancestry 2010 0.187*** 0.209*** 0.356***
(0.017) (0.032) (0.077)







Panel C: S.E. Clustered by State
Log Ancestry 2010 0.187*** 0.209*** 0.356***
(0.019) (0.029) (0.071)







Panel D: Clustered by County and Country
Log Ancestry 2010 0.187*** 0.209*** 0.356***
(0.028) (0.051) (0.120)







Panel E: Clustered by State and Country
Log Ancestry 2010 0.187*** 0.209*** 0.356***
(0.028) (0.048) (0.116)







Notes: This table shows variations based on four main regressions: standard specification (column 3 in Table 3),
communist natural experiment (column 5 in Table 4), intensive margin (based on column 2 in Panel A of Appendix
Table 19), and immigration 1990-2000 (column 1 in Table 6). In Panel A, we reproduce the standard error clustering
in our main tables; in Panel B, we cluster by county; in Panel C, we cluster by country, in Panel D we double cluster
by county and country, and in Panel E we double cluster by state and country.
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Appendix Table 14: Placebo Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FDI 2014 (Dummy)
Panel A Assign to alphabet neighbor
Log Ancestry 2010 -0.012 -0.007 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.012
(0.019) (0.014) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.027) (0.030)
N 612495 612495 612495 612495 459150 612495 612300
Panel B Assign to alphabet neighbor on a different continent
Log Ancestry 2010 -0.025 -0.020 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.014 0.013
(0.021) (0.014) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
N 612495 612495 612495 612495 459150 612495 612300
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Principal Components No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination × Continent FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin × Census Region FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3rd order poly in dist and lat No No No Yes Yes No No





−c(o)) No No No No No Yes No
Origin × State FE No No No No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from placebo regressions corresponding the the speci-
fications in Table 3. In Panel A, we assign the outcomes (FDI 2014 Dummy) for each origin country
to the next country in the alphabet. In Panel B, we assign the outcomes (FDI 2014 Dummy) for each
origin country to the next country in the alphabet that is from another continent.
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Appendix Table 15: The Effect of Ancestry on FDI: Five Largest Countries and Counties
FDI 2014 (Dummy)











Panel B: Largest 5 Counties Log Ancestry 2010










Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from IV regressions at the country-county level. The
dependent variable in all panels is the dummy for FDI in 2014. Panel A presents the coefficient on Log
Ancestry 2010 when we run our estimation separately for each of the largest five origin countries. Panel
B presents the coefficient on Log Ancestry 2010 when we run our estimation separately for each of the
five US counties with the largest population in 2010. We use {Ito,−r(d)(It−c(o),d/It−c(o))}t=1880,...,2000 and
principal components as IVs. All specifications control for log distance and latitude difference. Robust
standard errors are reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 16: The Effect of Ancestry on FDI: Country Specific Effects
Point Estimate Standard Error FDI 2014 (Dummy) > 0
United Arab Emirates 11.875*** (2.712) 60
Kuwait 6.098*** (2.120) 22
Finland 4.113*** (0.513) 180
New Zealand 2.980*** (0.511) 107
Oman 2.481 (1.597) 6
British Virgin Islands 2.467*** (0.604) 100
Australia 2.201*** (0.384) 369
Malaysia 2.005*** (0.406) 90
South Africa 1.832*** (0.247) 80
Tunisia 1.438*** (0.345) 9
Iceland 1.359*** (0.276) 25
Saudi Arabia 1.144*** (0.158) 29
Belgium and Luxembourg 1.086*** (0.087) 354
Puerto Rico 1.034*** (0.240) 26
Israel 0.944*** (0.156) 137
Bahamas 0.943*** (0.308) 44
Switzerland 0.814*** (0.048) 371
Denmark 0.684*** (0.043) 278
Thailand 0.583*** (0.070) 68
Japan 0.566*** (0.051) 575
Uruguay 0.541*** (0.115) 21
Austria 0.531*** (0.042) 148
Chile 0.502*** (0.078) 73
Brazil 0.496*** (0.047) 140
Barbados 0.462** (0.234) 38
Canada 0.461*** (0.024) 809
Norway 0.459*** (0.028) 239
Malta 0.451 (0.281) 11
Costa Rica 0.447*** (0.140) 30
Turkey 0.444*** (0.067) 48
Netherlands 0.442*** (0.019) 398
Panama 0.439*** (0.115) 44
Indonesia 0.413*** (0.076) 29
Argentina 0.412*** (0.056) 64
Sweden 0.405*** (0.018) 323
Senegal 0.383 (0.314) 2
France 0.346*** (0.013) 528
South Korea 0.346*** (0.023) 155
Liberia 0.341* (0.190) 6
Spain 0.335*** (0.014) 300
India 0.320*** (0.018) 233
China 0.299*** (0.015) 248
Kenya 0.292* (0.175) 5
Venezuela 0.275*** (0.046) 32
Britain 0.271*** (0.009) 664
Egypt 0.259*** (0.051) 23
Belize 0.255*** (0.086) 14
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Hungary 0.240*** (0.033) 52
Colombia 0.237*** (0.028) 45
Italy 0.219*** (0.007) 489
Peru 0.218*** (0.033) 30
Germany 0.216*** (0.009) 608
Portugal 0.206*** (0.028) 85
Samoa 0.204** (0.086) 5
Ireland 0.202*** (0.010) 247
Morocco 0.197** (0.078) 11
Nigeria 0.190*** (0.055) 18
Sri Lanka 0.180 (0.120) 6
Czechoslovakia 0.177*** (0.029) 54
Romania 0.173*** (0.041) 23
Mexico 0.171*** (0.011) 259
Pakistan 0.168*** (0.039) 23
USSR 0.165*** (0.015) 97
Ghana 0.156 (0.095) 6
Bulgaria 0.156** (0.064) 11
Philippines 0.154*** (0.019) 50
Lebanon 0.150*** (0.047) 20
Bolivia 0.142** (0.066) 8
Greece 0.131*** (0.028) 42
Trinidad and Tobago 0.130* (0.067) 15
Socialist Yugoslav 0.121*** (0.028) 29
Jamaica 0.114*** (0.032) 15
Honduras 0.103*** (0.032) 14
Algeria 0.099 (0.076) 3
Guatemala 0.097*** (0.033) 14
Poland 0.092*** (0.015) 63
Viet Nam 0.091*** (0.025) 18
Jordan 0.090 (0.063) 7
Cameroon 0.085 (0.065) 2
Dominican Republic 0.082*** (0.025) 16
Ecuador 0.081** (0.032) 15
Paraguay 0.079 (0.056) 4
Nicaragua 0.069* (0.036) 7
Albania 0.069 (0.046) 3
North Korea 0.068 (0.072) 1
El Salvador 0.066** (0.026) 13
Sudan 0.065 (0.065) 1
Fiji 0.065 (0.046) 5
Bangladesh 0.040 (0.032) 2
Cambodia 0.039 (0.028) 3
Haiti 0.026 (0.019) 2
Ethiopia 0.026 (0.025) 1
Syria 0.016 (0.016) 1
Myanmar 0.007 (0.007) 1
Afghanistan 0.003 (0.003) 1
Guyana 0.002 (0.002) 1
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Iraq 0.002 (0.002) 1
Cuba -0.000*** (0.000) 1
Libya -0.022 (0.024) 1
Grenada n/a n/a 0
Sierra Leone n/a n/a 0
Somalia n/a n/a 0
Iran n/a n/a 0
Tonga n/a n/a 0
Cape Verde n/a n/a 0
Mauritania n/a n/a 0
Nepal n/a n/a 0
Greenland n/a n/a 0
Yemen n/a n/a 0
Equatorial Guinea n/a n/a 0
Mongolia n/a n/a 0
State of Palestine n/a n/a 0
Lao n/a n/a 0
Notes: The table is an extension of Appendix Table 15 Panel A, where we only show the results
for top five ancestries. Results are sorted on the point estimate. The last column shows the number of





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 18: Heterogeneous Effects across Sectors and Firms
Log Ancestry 2010 FDI 2014 (Dummy) > 0
FDI 2014 (Dummy) (1) (2)





Information, Finance, Management, and other Services 0.143***
(0.024)
Construction, Real Estate, Accomodation, Recreation 0.125***
(0.021)




Panel B: Small vs. Large Firm Size
Above Median 0.112*** 1,840
(0.018)
Below Median 0.051** 723
(0.024)
p-value of χ2 test, H0: equality of coefficients 0.000
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates on Log Ancestry 2010 from IV regressions at the country-
county level. Each row of the table corresponds to a separate regression. The dependent variables in
all rows are dummy variables that are one if any firm within the indicated subset of firms in destination
county d has a parent or subsidiary in origin country o. These subsets of firms are five sector groups
(panel A) and for small versus large firms (panel B). The cutoff value between small and large firms is
the median employee number, which is 1380 for US firms that are subsidiaries and 1057 for US firms
that are parents. Throughout, we use {I to,−r(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))}t=1880,...,2000 and principal components as
intrumental variables. “FDI 2014 (Dummy) > 0” refers to the number of country-county pairs that have
an (non-zero) FDI link in the corresponding sector. All specifications control for log distance, latitude
difference, origin×destination-census-region, and destination×continent-of-origin fixed effects. Standard
errors are given in parentheses and are clustered at the origin country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 19: The Effect of Ancestry on the Intensive Margin of FDI
OLS IV/GMM IV/GMM IV/GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A Log Total # of FDI relationships
Log Ancestry 2010 0.245*** 0.356*** 0.292*** 0.147***
(0.048) (0.056) (0.021) (0.031)
N 10,851 10,851 10,851 10,851
Panel B
Log # of subsidiaries in destination
with shareholders in origin
Log Ancestry 2010 0.275*** 0.339*** 0.288*** 0.242***
(0.050) (0.059) (0.016) (0.045)
N 9,082 9,082 9,082 9,082
Panel C
Log # of workers employed at
subsidiaries in destination
Log Ancestry 2010 0.304* 0.077 0.326*** 0.192
(0.175) (0.236) (0.051) (0.139)
N 9,082 9,082 9,082 9,082
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination × Continent FE Yes Yes No No
Origin × Census Region FE Yes Yes No No
Principal Components No Yes Yes Yes
Heckman Correction No No No Yes
Notes: The table presents OLS (column 1) and IV/GMM (columns 2-4) esti-
mates of equation (7). The dependent variables are specified for each panel in
the table. The main variable of interest is Log Ancestry 2010. All IV columns
use as instruments the same set of variables as column 3 of Table 3. All spec-
ifications control for log distance, latitude difference, origin, and destination
fixed effects. The coefficient estimates on these controls are not reported in the
interest of space. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 20: The Effect of Ancestry on the Intensive Margin of Trade (State Level)
OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A Log Total # of FDI relationships
Log Ancestry 2010 1.001*** 1.374*** 0.079***
(0.077) (0.183) (0.025)
R2 0.659 0.626 0.847
N 2,208 2,202 2,191
Panel B Log Aggregate Exports
Log Ancestry 2010 1.519*** 2.993*** -0.149
(0.173) (0.357) (0.138)
R2 0.416 0.374 0.665
N 4,799 4,783 4,739
Panel C Log Aggregate Imports
Log Ancestry 2010 1.927*** 3.447*** 0.003
(0.148) (0.497) (0.150)
R2 0.419 0.360 0.576
N 3,823 3,764 3,815
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes
Destination FE No No Yes
Heckman Correction Yes Yes Yes
Panel D Log Exports to Vietnam




Panel E Log Exports to Japan




Origin FE Yes Yes
Destination FE No No
Notes: The table presents OLS and IV estimates of equa-
tion (7) at the state level for FDI and trade. The depen-
dent variables are the log number of total FDI links in 2014
(Panel A), the log of aggregate exports (from the US state)
(Panel B), aggregate imports (Panel C), exports to Vietnam
(Panel D), and exports to Japan (Panel E). Exports and
imports are measured in US dollars in 2011. In all columns,
we use {I to,−r(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))}t=1880,...,2000 and principal com-
ponents as excluded instruments. All specifications control
for log distance, latitude difference, and origin fixed effects.
Standard errors are given in parentheses and are double clus-
tered at the destination state and origin country. *, **, and
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 21: Thought Experiment: A Gold Rush in Los Angeles in 1880
Predicted Counterfactual Change
Ancestry 2010 FDI # Ancestry 2010 FDI # (in %, IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Germany 343,276 241 +65,344 +62.55
Ireland 256,621 40 +61,701 +58.21
UK 396,439 582 +26,645 +21.91
Norway 39,515 55 +4,657 +3.52
Sweden 51,395 71 +4,010 +3.03
France 77,372 278 +3,293 +2.48
Canada 27,722 531 +3,132 +2.36
Switzerland 10,156 162 +2,456 +1.84
Czechoslovakia 17,905 4 +2,140 +1.60
Netherlands 38,392 121 +1,638 +1.23
Notes: The table presents the number of individuals of selected ancestries living
in Los Angeles County (column 1), the number of FDI links between Los An-
geles County and the countries of origin (column 2), and the predicted changes
in these variables under a counterfactual scenario where the pre-1880 pull fac-
tor of Los Angeles is 5 times as large as in reality (columns 3 and 4). Column
3 shows the predicted absolute change in ancestry based on a regression analo-
gous to column 9 of Table 2 with Ancestry 2010 (in levels) as dependent vari-
able, again excluding the principal components. Column 4 shows the predicted
change of Total # of FDI relationships (in percent) based on the IV regression
of Log Total # of FDI relationships on Log Ancestry 2010, instrumented for by
{I to,−r(d)(I t−c(o),d/I t−c(o))}t=1880,...,2000, similar to column 2 of Appendix Table 19
without the principal components as instruments. All regressions control for log
distance and latitude difference and include a origin × destination-census-region,
and destination × continent-of-origin fixed effects. Only the 10 countries with
the highest absolute change in ancestry are shown in the interest of space. The
details for the construction of this thought experiment are presented in section
3.6.
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Appendix Table 22: Search terms for Germany and Italy
Germany Italy
Politicians
Angela Merkel Aldo Moro
Helmut Kohl Benito Mussolini
Willy Brandt Alessandra Mussolini
Joseph Goebbels Amintore Fanfani
Karl Marx Angelino Alfano
Actors
Ju¨rgen Prochnow Isabella Rossellini
Til Schweiger Robert De Niro
Franka Potente John Turturro
Udo Kier Roberto Rossellini
Daniel Bru¨hl Roberto Benigni
Athletes
Katarina Witt Mario Andretti
Dirk Nowitzki Armin Zoggeler
Boris Becker Roberto Baggio
Steffi Graf Andrea Barzagli
Franz Beckenbauer Gerhard Plankensteiner
Musicians
Ludwig van Beethoven Antonio Vivaldi
Nena Gioachino Rossini
Johann Sebastian Bach Giacomo Puccini
Nina Hagen Ennio Morricone
Felix Mendelssohn Luciano Pavarotti
This table shows the top five results from Google’s
Answer Box for each category for the countries Ger-
many and Italy when typing “notable [country] [cat-
egory]” into Google.
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Appendix Table 23: The Effect of Ancestry on Language: Language Specific Effects
Point Estimate Standard Error N # of US-born in d that
speak o at home in 2010
Aleut 1.608*** (0.028) 3,137 116
Malay 1.376 (0.897) 9,411 176
Arabic 1.222*** (0.171) 78,376 45,953
Spanish 1.172*** (0.380) 65,877 65,877
French 0.212*** (0.018) 87,836 87,416
Haitian Creole 0.198*** (0.015) 3,137 595
Greek 0.196*** (0.033) 6,273 1,849
Vietnamese 0.188*** (0.006) 3,137 1,739
Portuguese 0.174*** (0.030) 28,233 13,095
Korean 0.170*** (0.041) 6,274 3,040
Mon-Khmer 0.167*** (0.005) 3,136 316
Urdu 0.159*** (0.020) 3,137 499
Bengali 0.153*** (0.015) 3,137 191
Japanese 0.142*** (0.007) 3,137 1,972
Persian 0.102*** (0.005) 3,137 538
Chinese 0.085*** (0.005) 3,137 1,745
Thai 0.077*** (0.010) 3,137 619
Polish 0.061*** (0.015) 3,137 1,670
Filipino 0.059*** (0.002) 3,137 1,229
Laotian 0.050*** (0.009) 3,137 592
Albanian 0.049*** (0.014) 3,137 181
Italian 0.041*** (0.005) 6,274 5,068
Samoan 0.036 (0.031) 3,137 261
Amharic 0.035** (0.015) 3,137 123
Tongan 0.034 (0.027) 3,137 115
Russian 0.027*** (0.008) 3,137 53
German 0.022*** (0.002) 15,685 15,513
Hindi 0.015*** (0.003) 3,137 558
Rumanian 0.014** (0.007) 3,137 417
Turkish 0.012** (0.005) 3,137 263
Croatian 0.012** (0.006) 3,137 65
Swahili 0.006 (0.005) 6,274 606
Finnish 0.005 (0.012) 3,137 373
Magyar 0.004** (0.002) 3,137 578
Indonesian 0.002 (0.003) 3,137 130
Swedish 0.002** (0.001) 3,137 888
Dutch 0.002** (0.001) 9,411 4,746
Norwegian 0.002** (0.001) 3,137 965
Pashto 0.002 (0.002) 3,137 26
Czech 0.001*** (0.000) 3,137 367
Burmese 0.001 (0.001) 3,137 19
Sinhalese 0.000 (0.001) 3,137 9
Danish 0.000*** (0.000) 6,274 1,200
Irish 0.000*** (0.000) 3,137 459
Afrikaans -0.000*** (0.000) 3,137 6
Nepali -0.000*** (0.000) 3,137 52
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Bulgarian -0.000*** (0.000) 3,137 85
Creole n/a n/a 3,136 2,252
Bantu n/a n/a 9,411 432
Notes: The table is an extension of Table 8, where we only show the results for a set of selected
languages. The table is sorted on the size of the point estimate. The last column shows the # of
US-born residents in d that speak the language of o at home.
Appendix Table 24: Accounting For the Effect of Ancestry
FDI Dummy (2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Ancestry 2010 0.222*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.213*** -0.025
(0.021) (0.068) (0.068) (0.025) (0.028)
Sector Similarity (Rank Correlation) 0.012
(0.020)
Sector Similarity (Cosine Correlation) 0.022
(0.023)
Log # of residents in d that speak language of o at home 0.005
(0.006)
Information Demand Index (standardized) 0.078***
(0.013)
N 612,495 23,708 23,708 454,812 19,110
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Principal Components Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows IV regressions at the county-country (columns 1-4) and DMA-country (column 5) level.
Each column is a variation of the simple specification (column 2 in Table 3) that has origin and destination fixed
effects. All variables are defined as in the previous tables. The relatively low number of observations in columns
2 and 3 is due to data availability in the industry share of employment: When calculating the correlation between
industries’ share of employment in county d and country o, the correlation coefficient is missing for those country-
county pairs that have at least one missing share of employment. Standard errors are given in parentheses and are
clustered at the origin country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Appendix Table 25: Generational Effects
FDI 2014 (Dummy)
IV IV OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Ancestry 2010 0.187*** 0.155*** 0.242*** 0.163***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.043) (0.014)
Log Foreign-born 2010 0.207*** -0.012 -0.082*
(0.014) (0.031) (0.049)
Log Foreign-born 1970 0.286*** 0.046
(0.025) (0.034)
N 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495 612,495
Notes: The table presents the OLS (column 3) and IV (all other columns) estimates of
equation (1), contrasting the effect of ancestry and first-generation immigrants (foreign-
born) on FDI. The dependent variable is the dummy for FDI in 2014. All IV columns use as
instruments the same set of variables as column 3 of Table 3. All specifications control for log
distance, latitude difference, origin×destination-census-region, and destination×continent-
of-origin fixed effects. The coefficient estimates on these control variables are not reported
in the interest of space. Standard errors are given in parentheses and clustered at the
origin country level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. For column 4, the Kleinbergen-Paap rk LM statistic on the excluded
instruments is 18.211 with a p-value of 0.150. We are thus unable to reject the null that
our instruments do not induce differential variation in the two endogenous variables, and
interpret any difference in the coefficient estimates with caution. The Kleinbergen-Paap rk
LM statistic on the excluded instruments is 29.04 with a p-value of 0.007. We thus have
sufficient power to detect differences between the coefficient estimates on the two endogenous
variables.
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